Cognitive Defeasible Reasoning: the Extent to Which Forms of Defeasible Reasoning Correspond with Human Reasoning

Baker, Clayton Kevin and Denny, Claire and Freund, Paul and Meyer, Thomas (2020) Cognitive Defeasible Reasoning: the Extent to Which Forms of Defeasible Reasoning Correspond with Human Reasoning, Artificial Intelligence Research: First Southern African Conference for AI Research, SACAIR 2020 Muldersdrift, South Africa, Communications in Computer and Information Science, 1342, Springer.

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Classical logic forms the basis of knowledge representation and reasoning in AI. In the real world, however, classical logic alone is insufficient to describe the reasoning behaviour of human beings. It lacks the flexibility so characteristically required of reasoning under uncer- tainty, reasoning under incomplete information and reasoning with new information, as humans must. In response, non-classical extensions to propositional logic have been formulated, to provide non-monotonicity. It has been shown in previous studies that human reasoning exhibits non- monotonicity. This work is the product of merging three independent studies, each one focusing on a different formalism for non-monotonic reasoning: KLM defeasible reasoning, AGM belief revision and KM belief update. We investigate, for each of the postulates propounded to characterise these logic forms, the extent to which they have correspondence with human reasoners. We do this via three respective experiments and present each of the postulates in concrete and abstract form. We discuss related work, our experiment design, testing and evaluation, and report on the results from our experiments. We find evidence to believe that 1 out of 5 KLM defeasible reasoning postulates, 3 out of 8 AGM belief revi- sion postulates and 4 out of 8 KM belief update postulates conform in both the concrete and abstract case. For each experiment, we performed an additional investigation. In the experiments of KLM defeasible rea- soning and AGM belief revision, we analyse the explanations given by participants to determine whether the postulates have a normative or descriptive relationship with human reasoning. We find evidence that suggests, overall, KLM defeasible reasoning has a normative relationship with human reasoning while AGM belief revision has a descriptive rela- tionship with human reasoning. In the experiment of KM belief update, we discuss counter-examples to the KM postulates.

Item Type: Book chapter
Subjects: Computing methodologies > Artificial intelligence > Knowledge representation and reasoning
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Date Deposited: 01 Sep 2021 09:59
Last Modified: 01 Sep 2021 09:59

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