Casini, Giovanni and Meyer, Thomas (2017) Belief Change in a Preferential Non-Monotonic Framework, Proceedings of International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), 19-25 August, Melbourne, Australia, 925-935, AAAI Press.
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Abstract
Belief change and non-monotonic reasoning are usually viewed as two sides of the same coin, with results showing that one can formally be de- fined in terms of the other. In this paper we show that we can also integrate the two formalisms by studying belief change within a (preferential) non-monotonic framework. This integration relies heavily on the identification of the monotonic core of a non-monotonic framework. We consider belief change operators in a non-monotonic propositional setting with a view towards preserving consistency. These results can also be applied to the preser- vation of coherence—an important notion within the field of logic-based ontologies. We show that the standard AGM approach to belief change can be adapted to a preferential non-monotonic frame- work, with the definition of expansion, contraction, and revision operators, and corresponding repre- sentation results. Surprisingly, preferential AGM belief change, as defined here, can be obtained in terms of classical AGM belief change.
| Item Type: | Conference paper |
|---|---|
| Subjects: | Computing methodologies > Artificial intelligence |
| Alternate Locations: | https://www.ijcai.org/proceedings/2017/129 |
| Date Deposited: | 23 Nov 2017 |
| Last Modified: | 10 Oct 2019 15:31 |
| URI: | http://pubs.cs.uct.ac.za/id/eprint/1204 |
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