


Crime: an infamous thing...

- 2011: 3.3 million crimes
 - > 50% unreported
 - petty crimes? No - burglaries, hijackings, rapes...
- Lasley (1995): anonymity influences a person's decision to report a crime
 - less repercussions

Mobile phones: a popular thing!

Figure 1: Africa – Mobile Subscribers and Penetration (2002-2012)



Cry-Help

A mobile crime reporting application

Problem statement

There currently does not exist a **cost-effective** way to report crime to the police **covertly** and **securely**, *and* have the information kept **safe** **efficiently**.

Work division

- Thabo: supporting covertness
interface design task...
- Nina: secure transmission of data
- Tami: performance and security of the backend system
- overarching principle: performance
(=> cost-effective)

Whither do we go from here?

Motivation for *Cry-Help*

Project description

Problem statement

Work division

A closer look at each component

- Interface design

- Secure transmission

- Backend security and performance

Conclusion

Interface design

Covertness in *Cry-Help*


The Problem



The Problem

Often individuals are unable to report their circumstance due to:

- Fear of retaliation from the criminal oppressor
 - Do not want to be seen reporting the crime
 - Want the oppressor to be caught in the act
- Identification by the public
 - Public opinion
 - Credibility



The Question then?

- conceal the reporting process
- What means should be used to gather data
- how much data can be pre-collected?
- What kind of interface
- what of time constraints in emergency situations?
-



The Question then?

Is it possible to develop a system that allows effective covert message passing in an oppressive environment on mobile devices?

Our Answer

An mobile **interactive** prototype that allows **data collection** and **crime reporting** in a potentially **hostile environment**.

Data fields necessary for an effective crime report have been collected from authorities such as the CPS.

Design Considerations

- **What information** is important for an effective report
- **Who** is making the report
- **When** can they supply that information



Design Considerations

- From related works 2 interface concepts were conceived.
- Essentially these interfaces are:

Design Considerations Perspective: 1st Person Report




Design Considerations Perspective: 1st Person Report

Interface 1(1st person)- data accumulated is from the victim

- **Panic Button** - report is immediately compiled and sent to authorities
- No/very **little time for conventional input**
- Potentially **hostile environment**, must be sent without second party knowing
- There must be **no trace of communication** eg sent mail, beeps or vibration
- There must still be a way to **confirm a sent message**

Design Considerations Perspective: 3rd Person Report

But what if you see a crime, happen to
someone else? #dead_give_away



Design Considerations Perspective: 3rd Person Report

Interface 2(3rd person) -data collected is not necessarily from a third person

- Report may/may not be sent during the crime
- Data accumulated is potentially **more substantial** such as details of the crime an observer can give
- Data sent in a **uniform format**
- Use of **visualisations** and other cues to extract as much data

Methodology

- A **design** will be devised **iteratively** with the aid of **volunteers** to try capture what kinds of input are the most suitable to send data covertly
 - gestures
 - typing
 - speed dial
- 1st person interface
 - prototyping
- 3rd person interface
 - low fidelity
 - high fidelity prototyping

Development

- The application will be developed for an Android target device with the Android SDK on Java
 - Growing smart phone presence
 - Android has largest market share
- Use of existing libraries for gesture recognition

Current Work

Currently the application is in the design stage.

I am working with

- Paper prototypes
- Questionnaires
- high fidelity prototype

Will refine the prototype (incorporate 1st person reporting) for more usability testing

Prototype

The image displays an Android development environment with three main components:

- Virtual Device 1 (5554:device2):** Shows a prototype app interface. The top bar includes a yellow '2' icon, signal strength, 3G, battery, and time (8:44). The app title is 'Detail'. The main content area has a header 'Brief Detail of the Offence' and a text input field containing 'robbery'. Below this is a 'Date of occurrence' field with '9 8 2013' and a 'Current' button. At the bottom, there is a 'Time of occurrence' field with a dark overlay containing the text: 'Message Sent xxxaaa001 xj45 4545467 2 forgetfullane ottowapark'. A 'Commit' button is located at the very bottom.
- Code Editor:** Shows Java code for an activity. Visible snippets include:

```
.SmsManager;  
;  
;  
itText;  
ast;  
  
y extends Activity {  
  
w String[4];  
;  
  
ate(Bundle savedInstanceState,  
avedInstanceState);  
.layout.activity_main);  
() == 1)  
  
();  
  
ateOptionsMenu(Menu menu  
enu; this adds items to  
) .inflate(R.menu.main, m  
  
ails(View view)  
  
s[0] + "\n" + values[1]  
new Intent(this, Detail.  
userData, userData);  
tent);  
  
ails()
```
- Virtual Device 2 (5556:device3):** Shows a virtual home screen with a Google search bar, a large white circle on a dark background, a 'Camera' app icon, and a dock with icons for Phone, Browser, App Drawer, Home, and Browser.

Secure transfer protocol


Secure transmission of sensitive data

Problem Statement (1/2)

- Mobile communication security entails
 - **Confidentiality**
 - Authenticity
 - Non repudiation
 - Integrity
 - **Privacy**
- Most cryptographic algorithms tend to be too costly
- Tradeoff: security vs performance
- Mobile data usually unencrypted yet **crime report data is highly sensitive**
- Many protocols have been suggested....

End-to-end security for mobile communication

The tug of war



It's possible!

No! Too costly

Related Work

- Mynttinen (2000) on proxy-based security solutions such as WTLS for WAP
- Arapinis et al(2012) points out 3G weakness of linkability and discusses improvements
- Kayayurt & Tuglular (2006) on end-to-end security on mobile devices using TLS and SSL

Research question

Can we implement **end-to-end security** on mobile devices that **performs well**? *Specifically for mobile crime reporting*

Aim

- Implement Kayayurt and Tuglular's protocol
- Test

Why?

- One of few that deals with mobile to computer communication
- Use of TLS which is already well known and trusted

Design & Methodology

- Protocol based on TLS specifications
- Client/server architecture
- Class diagram defined and paper will be used as guide for implementation
- Implementation to be done using Java and Bouncy Castle Crypto Package
- Iterative implementation

Test Plan

- Want to test for both security and performance
- Test for MITM attacks
- Test to ensure that there won't be any replay message attacks

What has been done so far

Demo

- Got the client/server connection running
- Kayayurt and Tuglular's proposed protocol proved to be too complicated
- SSL was used instead
- SSL easier and supported by android
- Looked into using NS-2 for testing
 - supports c++ and we are using java :(
- Looked into public key cryptography (costly but could be optimised)

Future

- Finalise implementation
- More merging with other team mates parts
- Test (compare protocols)
- Write up
- **Celebrate!!!!**

Backend security & performance

Excellent safekeeping *and* excellent performance

Recent news...



The image is a screenshot of the eNCA website. At the top left is the eNCA logo, which consists of a stylized 'e' in a blue square followed by 'NCA' in white letters on a dark blue background. To the right of the logo is a red button with the word 'BETA' in white. Below the logo is a navigation bar with several categories: 'Top Stories', 'South Africa' (which is highlighted in orange), 'Africa', 'World', 'Money', and 'Sports'. The main content area features a large headline: 'EXCLUSIVE: Thousands vulnerable after SAPS website is hacked'. Below the headline, there is a video player area. On the left side of the video player is a thumbnail image of a protest sign that reads 'SAVE ELDOS KILL DRUG'. To the right of the thumbnail is a text snippet: 'Eldorado Park residents say they feel much safer thanks to an intervention spearheaded by President Jacob Zuma.' At the bottom of the page, there is a footer with the text 'South Africa | Tuesday 21 May 2013 - 5:05 PM' and three small icons labeled 'T I T'.

Source: <http://www.enca.com/south-africa/thousands-vulnerable-after-saps-website-hijacked>

DB Encryption: Motivation

- Protecting data has been an important theme of research
 - more and more sensitive data
 - more and more sophisticated attacks
- Main result so far?
 - Access control systems... various!
- But what happens if those are bypassed?
 - DB is completely readable and otherwise unprotected.
- Enter: DB encryption!

What has been done

- Basic approach: encrypt data-at-rest, and decrypt when needed
 - not too useful
- Growing interest in querying *encrypted* data
- But before we get there...

Access control + Cryptography

- Related work: most use 'dependent' keys...
- ... but they too can have their flaws
 - e.g. DB availability issues, performance (derive, derive, derive...)

Research question

Crime data need to be kept with utmost security, but also need to be available to officers promptly. In this context:

*Can we design a **role-based access control** scheme that works with cryptography - and particularly **'independent' keys** - to add a deeper layer of security to the data?*

Progress and the future

- Developing a basic framework:
 - password-based key generation
 - public-private keys for each user
 - encrypt each user's data with their key
- *Next up:* implementing an efficient mechanism to communicate keys to users higher up in the hierarchy
- *Then:* testing – scalability, latency, security, performance

Conclusion

In a nutshell...

We want *Cry-Help* to be an improvement of its ancestors (E9, CrimePush...)

- lightweight

use tech that people already own

- highly secure

transmission + safekeeping

- ‘anonymous’

covert + secure handling

Many thanks; questions?



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