


Multi-Layered Security in the Internet of the Things

Lutando Ngqakaza

A Thesis presented for the degree of
Masters of Science



ISAT Laboratory
Department of Computer Science
University of Cape Town
South Africa
August 2014

Dedicated to

My family, friends, and friend of over 7 years, Tamzon Jacobs thanks for the support, love, and patience.

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Abstract

It is well discussed and understood that there is still a need for suitable security for the Internet of Things. It is however still not clear how existing or emerging security paradigms can be effectively applied to a network of constrained nodes in a lossy communications environment. This thesis provides a survey into what routing protocols can be used with network security in mind. What will also be discussed, is an implementation, that in conjunction with a robust routing protocol, can provide security for a network of constrained devices with a certain level of confidence. The implementation and design involves including communications encryption and centralized non-cryptographic methods for securing the network. This thesis basically explores the use of multiple security mechanisms in an Internet of Things environment by using Contiki OS as the platform of choice for simulations and testing.

Declaration

The work in this thesis is based on research carried out at the ISAT Laboratory, the Department of Computer Sciences, The University of Cape Town. No part of this thesis has been submitted elsewhere for any other degree or qualification and it is all my own work unless referenced to the contrary in the text. I hereby declare that this written work I have submitted is original work which I alone have authored and which is written in my own words. With the signature I declare that I have being informed regarding normal academic citation rules and I conform to citation conventions customary to the sciences. This written work may be tested electronically for plagiarism.

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Glossary

6LoWPAN IPv6 over Low power Wireless Personal Area Networks.

ACL Access Control List.

AES Advanced Encryption Standard.

CCM Counter with CBC-MAC.

CIA Confidentiality Integrity Availability.

CSP Centralised Security Process.

DES Data Encryption Standard.

DoS Denial of Service.

ETX Expected Transmissions.

FIPS Federal Information Processing Standards group.

HMAC Hash-Based Message Authentication Code.

IEEE Institute of Electrical and Eletronics Engineers.

IETF Internet Engineering Task Force.

IoT The Internet of the Things.

IP Internet Protocol.

IPSec Internet Protocol Security.

IPv6 Internet Protocol version 6.

LIBP Least Interference Beaconsing Protocol.

LLN Low-Powered and Lossy Network.

MAC Message Authentication Code.

MAC (2) Medium Access Control.

OF Objective Function.

OS Operating System.

RFC Request For Comments.

RFID Radio-Frequency Identification.

RPL Routing Protocol for LLNs.

SSH Secure Shell.

UDP User Datagram Protocol.

USN Ubiquitous Sensor Network.

WSN Wireless Sensor Network.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

The integration of Radio-frequency identification (RFID) devices, sensors and actuators into a ubiquitous sensor network (USN) has been identified as one of the most promising technologies that will play an important role in the emerging Internet of Things that aims to expose constrained devices to the greater world wide web of information *anywhere* and *any-time* using *anything* [1]. The IoT promises to identify and sense what is happening in our daily living environment to provide services and that provide us with safety or convenience. Some examples of such services or applications include efficient energy management, pollution monitoring, vehicular traffic management, drought prediction and control, disaster prevention or home security. All of these mentioned applications could in theory use constrained devices in the same way that we use web services in the world wide web today in that these constrained devices can be exposed over the world wide web. A typical USN deployment consists of a new generation of networks where RFID readers are integrated into sensing nodes which are networked and used as both a sensor and a backbone or link for a communication infrastructure where the sensing devices are used to sense what is happening in their environment while the RFID devices are used to identify the objects in location in the environment. In such a deployment, the data collected via the RFID and sensor devices is then fed into gateways where the information is processed and used in making decisions that translate to effective management. In a typical IoT environment, a conglomeration of RFID tags are attached to objects in a sensing/localized environment where the location of these

objects is identified using the RFID technology while the sensor devices are used to sense and collect the environmental variables.

1.1 Motivation

From an implementation and deployment point of view, additional complexity can arise from a networking point of view if one wants to secure a network of ubiquitous sensor networks (USNs). Securing a network of ubiquitous sensor devices is a worthwhile endeavour since it helps guarantee the goals of the Internet of Things, the goals of the Internet of Things is to expose constrained devices onto such as information by these devices can be provided *anywhere* and *any-time* using *anything* [1].

It is important to realise that much like traditional wired networks, there is no absolute way to go about securing them, rather a general heuristic can be applied such that if the security is implemented correctly then the network is relatively secure [2]. However in the case of ubiquitous sensor networks (USNs) the problem arises that not all devices can be guaranteed to have similar computational power.

Another motivating factor is that the location of this research is in South Africa, and in South Africa there are still extremely rural areas devoid of any form of network connectivity or international network connections are sporadic and unreliable. This research could have an effect on the way in which network planners deploy these ubiquitous sensor networks into production. The fact that rural communities could benefit from research like this serves as another motivation for this thesis.

1.2 Contribution

This thesis focuses on looking at how routing protocols in wireless sensor networks (WSNs) can be further secured by adding security mechanisms on top of the protocols. At the time of writing of this master's thesis, no implementation for for the Least Interference Beaconing Protocol (LIBP) [3] exists on the Contiki platform,

this thesis will show how the LIBP works in Contiki and will compare it to the other popular routing protocols [4,5].

Furthermore this master's thesis will give an in-depth analysis of the mainstream routing protocols and will suggest a method of further securing them in their current implementation. Most of these implementations are geared towards being friendly in constrained environments like wireless sensor networks (WSNs). The method of further securing these networks will be by virtue of using the gateway, or root, or sink node as a monitoring party which oversees the networks' well-being based on traffic data, this node will also have the responsibility to penalise nodes which seem to behave in a negative way in terms of the networks' deployment goals.

Following the previous contribution, an overview of what IEEE 804.15.4 MAC layer security provides in terms of confidentiality, integrity, and authentication will be discussed. IEEE 804.15.4 as specified has a few shortcomings and strengths, it is important to outline the problems with the specification and relate them to the goals of this thesis.

The combination of using multiple security mechanisms can allow the network deployer to define what sort of deployment she wants. This thesis will finally show how the use of all of the minor contributions can be tweaked to allow for a system that can be configured from deployment based on the use case desired. This allows for deployments to use the required amount of security for the desired deployment to avoid unnecessary extra overheads for features that are not required. That is the contribution of this thesis.

1.3 Outline

This thesis will outline and introduce various constrained network routing protocols, one of them being the Least Interference Beaconsing Protocol (LIBP) [3]. Initially the security landscape in WSNs and the IoT will be overlooked in Chapter 2. In Chapter 3, will be the Design and Implementation of the entire masters research project from both an high level and from an experiment setup standpoint. This thesis will also outline these various routing protocols in a survey style format in Chapter 4 along

with introducing a new routing protocol called LIBP. Chapter 5 will cover the basic encryption mechanisms used to achieve data communications security. Chapter 6 will introduce a concept of using the central gateway's computational power in a constrained network to do some form of non-cryptographic security oversight on the network by doing various checks on the network. Chapters 7, and 8, will cover Discussion, and Conclusion respectively.

Chapter 2

Security Landscape

This chapter gives an overview of what the security requirements are of an IoT deployment. And therefore what guidelines can be followed in order to secure such a constrained network. Garcia-Monarch, et al. and Stammerer, et al. of the IPSO alliance [2,6] identify potential security threats in IoT deployments and also provide guidelines towards the prevention or protection of these security attacks.

2.1 Motivation

The adoption rate of the use of smart objects or constrained devices in various industries is on the rise. If history is any yardstick to go by, any system that implements a networking interface should have some security. Even non-critical systems could be hijacked in order to carry out an attack on another valuable target [2]. This has been the case in "normal" computing systems connected via the world wide web. It is important to value that the role of these constrained devices is typically to collect data and communicate that data in some form whenever necessary to achieve information gathering.

some industries which would benefit by the securing of these constrained networks would include:

Environmental - Research based applications which may involve the moni-

toring of wild life, birds, small animals. The monitoring of environmental status variables, for example, chemical and biological composition of the area, or pollution in the area. These activities are incredibly popular in the fields of the environmental conservation sciences, or in general the life sciences.

Agriculture - In the agriculture industry, there are many applications which are emerging as viable method to enforce sustainable farming. Irrigation systems which take into account projected weather forecasts or soil moisture could result in a very environmentally and economically friendly solution for individuals in the agriculture industry.

Military - The military industry provides a wide variety of use cases for secure constrained networks. The monitoring of friendly forces, field surveillance, and attack detection are a few areas in which the military industry has purposed constrained networks to serve.

Medicine and Health - Remote patient monitoring and portable diagnostic machines are been used in conjunction with constrained devices to deliver medical services to patients in remote or rural areas [7].

Smart Cities and Homes - "Smart Grid" electricity monitoring which helps providers respond to electricity demands swiftly. Other smart city applications include smart traffic lights and smart public parking facilities. On the Smart Home front, home automation and home security are the main use cases.

It is clear to see how having these systems deployed in an unsecured manner can result in disorder, the loss of life, or the loss of finances. These critical systems cannot be deployed without some level of security implementation on the constrained network. It should also be noted that not all of these systems need to be secured with the same level of scrutiny. In constrained networks the general resistance to security arises because adding security to a constrained network adds more overhead

in terms of raw computation, stored power usage, and radio communications.

2.2 Security Concerns

2.3 Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability

The CIA Triad - Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability applies to all sub domains in computer science when it comes to information security.

Confidentiality - Refers to keeping information secret or private from untrusted third parties. Confidentiality is typically achieved by encryption. In a constrained network its very deployment use case determines whether confidentiality is required or not. In the use case of having a sensor that reads power usage in a household then a single reading of such a sensor is typically considered non-confidential. However if it is the case that the sensor is reading in time stamped values of a households' energy usage then that data is considered confidential since if that data reaches a malicious user, he or she can infer sleeping patterns and home energy usage patterns in order to plan a robbery on the household.

Integrity - Refers to guaranteeing that data cannot be modified without authorization. Integrity is typically achieved through Message Integrity Codes or Message Authentication Codes, sometimes called hashes or digests. These methods allow for a communicator to sign a message with a code that can be verified cryptographically by a receiver of a message. In the case of constrained devices, an integrity check may be desirable on the commands they execute. Integrity checks may also be done on firmware to make sure that the correct firmware is running.

Authenticity is a closely related concept to integrity. Since integrity [2] refers to checking that the data has not been tampered, authenticity refers to verifying the source of information, whether that is an entity or a person or a device. Things like digital certificates and signatures can provide both integrity and authentication

in most instances. As it stands there is no standard way of doing authentication on constrained devices and smart networks however the push is in the way of X.509v3 digital certificates.

Availability - Accounts for ensuring the information collected by the network is available for consumption when it is needed. In order to ensure a good uptime, not only does the firmware need to be robust and fail-proof but the constrained network itself has to be resilient to denial-of-service (DoS) attack. A typical DoS type attack on a constrained network is an attack that breaks the routing within the constrained network, or it is one that overloads nodes with requests such that legitimate requests cannot be serviced. The ROLL (Routing Over Low power and Lossy Networks) working group within the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) is working on standardizing a routing security framework for IoT deployments [5]. A portion of that framework will be discussed in Chapter 3. These routing frameworks will safeguard against flood attacks or attacks on the collective routing logic of the network.

Depending on the environment and application use case. A network planner may want to chose a combination of the CIA triad or all of them to secure the network.

2.4 Common Attacks

The Constrained RESTful Environments (CoRE) working group under the IETF has compiled a comprehensive list of common attacks that arise in constrained networks and Low powered and Lossy Networks (LLNs) [2].

Extraction of Security Secrets - Constrained devices are very often deployed in remote environments or environments void of any skilled humans. Normally this means that these devices could be physically unprotected and can be easily captured by an attacker. An attacker can then reverse engineer the firmware on the device to extract security keys or other credentials. The whole network may be compromised if this happens [2].

Device Cloning & Tampering - Given the ubiquitous nature of constrained devices. If an attacker gets hold of a device, she could do a byte by byte copy of an existing firmware by device capturing [2]. In essence the network could end up with multiple devices with the same identity, or the same device could end up having multiple identities [8]. Or the device could be captured to do other malicious activities.

The attacks above usually require physical presence of an attacker. It is therefore customary to consider these attacks to go beyond the scope of information communications security, these issues are mostly dealt with other solutions that normally don't have anything to do with the constrained devices themselves so for the focus of this thesis we will not consider these attacks.

Nodes Reporting Bogus Data - While a reality of most constrained systems is that they are quite prone to adverse hardware problems that may translate to bad sensor readings or erroneous communication. No good solution yet exists for this sort of problem however a decent anomaly detection system on the gateway/base station could prove to be a cheap fix to this problem.

Battery Attacks - Or attacks on system lifetime are attacks that are carried out in order to deplete a group of nodes or a particular critical node in a constrained network. There are many ways to carry out a battery attack but generally these attacks also affect the systems uptime which is related to how available the network is [2].

Operating System Vulnerabilities - Many constrained devices dont use an OS. But of those that do it is important to realise that if the OS as a platform is not stable or secure it may cause security issues along the line.

Routing Attack - A routing attack is an attack where a node asserts to the

network and neighbouring nodes that it has a route metric or link metric that is attractive, however is false. An example of such an attack is a Sinkhole attack, this is where a node in the network broadcasts a link metric that would entice neighbouring nodes to use it as an intermediary hop for routing. This in turn means that neighbouring nodes would forward their packets to this node that is advertising a false link metric. Once this is achieved that node could carry out selective forwarding where the node can decide which packets can be dropped or forwarded up the routing tree towards the gateway.

Denial-of-Service Attack - This is where an attacker can continuously send requests to be processed by a node or the gateway which in turn could hog up all the computational resources of the gateway or critical nodes. This is a very tough attack to guard against especially in the IoT where constrained devices usually have a low memory budget and minimal computational power, and not to mention they run on stored energy, or solar power in some cases [2].

Man-in-the-Middle Attack - In an unsecured network, a man-in-the-middle (MIM) attack is possible throughout the lifetime of the network as long as it remains unsecured. A man in the middle attack is an attack on the network where a node can assume the identity or a role of a particular node and cause a break in communication between two parties. In a secure network, a MIM attack could be possible during the key commissioning phase of the network. This is typically when key materials are exchanged between network entities. If the key exchange protocol or key agreement protocol assumes that no third party is able to eavesdrop on the exchange then a man in the middle attack is more than possible [6].

2.5 Suggested Guidelines

If we want to safeguard against the attacks above it is a requirement that we must ensure that the CIA triad is in effect. With a few more additional security require-

ments we can ensure a reasonably robust network. depending on the constrained devices not all of these features or goals can be met due to the wide variety of constrained devices that span a great spectrum of computational capabilities.

Non-Repudiation - This is the notion that all transactions within the network cannot be denied having happened if they happened. So for example a party cannot deny having received a packet nor can the sender deny having sent the packet.

Data Freshness - Data freshness implies that data cannot be replayed unless required by the communications protocol. Also in the case of keys, it ensures that keys are fresh. This in turn removes the risk of replay attacks.

In the following sections, IPSO and CoRE have made suggestions (where they apply) when one wants to deploy a constrained network [2, 6].

2.5.1 Physical Security

Previously in the chapter, we saw that due to the portable nature of constrained devices, and the very nature or environment in which they are deployed, leaves these devices exposed to physical attacks. One possible attack is called *node capture*, where an attacker tries to gain control of a device through physical means typically. These types of attacks are relatively easy on devices which are deployed without tamper proof casing. Becher, et al. noted that countermeasures are possible against node capture attacks, some of them being:

1. By monitoring nodes for periods, or noticing the removal of a node from the deployment area. The network could do revocation actions against suspicious nodes. Or the node itself may destroy its own data if it suspects a physical attack.
2. Build additional protection around a partially vulnerable platform and maintain it to keep up-to-date with the newest developments in embedded systems security and attacks.
3. Protecting the bootstrap loader password to curb unauthorised access.

2.5.2 Link-Layer Security

In constrained networks both IEEE 802.15.4 implements a sub layer of the Link-Layer (being the MAC layer) which has rudimentary security features like AES-128 encryption and CBC-MAC. In 802.11 WPA2 should be used in conjunction with AES encryption. For the most part 6LoWPAN is the current de facto communications protocol for the IoT. 6LoWPAN builds upon the layers that IEEE 802.15.4 provides. IEEE 802.15.4 at it's link layer provides both encryption and integrity verification which is achieved by a single pre-shared key used for symmetric cryptography. And integrity is realised by using Message Authentication Codes (MAC) in the packets. The main downside to this approach is that this can only provide security on a hop-by-hop basis. Which implies each node has to be a trusted entity for the network to be secure. As it stands, end to end security in 6LoWPAN networks is still a researched topic.

2.5.3 FIPS-Certified Cryptographic Software

In the military, health, and government industries along with their contractors are required to use security implementations whose cryptographic functions have been FIPS certified by The Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) group at NIST. Even in industries that do not require such a robust certification, it is considered good practice to highly consider the certified software packages [2, 6].

2.5.4 Leverage Existing Security Standards

To ensure interoperability while achieving the main goal of security, using tried and tested security solutions can result in conforming to standards across multiple bodies like the IETF (Internet Engineering Task Force), IEEE (Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers), and the IEC (International Electro-technical Commission).

2.5.5 Code and Choice Optimization for Constrained Devices

It is important to realise that for some devices, due to the fact that they have a very small computational budget, it may not be feasible to implement some solutions or encryption algorithms. Additionally, porting code to the constrained device can prove to be a simple activity for very capable devices but for lower budget devices it may prove to be impossible or far less feasible. Sometimes it is a good exercise to note which algorithms can work on which devices and also consider their energy footprint since heavier algorithms will use up more stored power per operation.

Compatibility - In the interest of interoperability, it would suit the deployment better in the long term if the deployment is geared towards being compatible for every network and any device that implements any solution of the chosen protocols.

Speed - Cryptographic algorithms and ciphers vary in complexity. The general trade-off when it comes to ciphers is that the quicker they are the less secure they are.

In essence a security package should be chosen that best fits the deployment both in terms of what the requirements are and what the devices capabilities are.

Cipher	Pros	Cons
AES (256, 192, 128)	Ensures Compatibility	Large Code Footprint
Rijndael	High Number of key and block sizes	Decryption is computationally intense
ARCFOUR	Fast	Considered weak
Blowfish	Fast and Strong	Low adoption and support
3DES	Considered very strong	Relatively Slow

Table 2.1: Cipher Choices

2.6 Summary

When it comes to securing constrained networks, the very fragmented nature of this domain it could make it very difficult to effectively secure your network. Any constrained network security solution should be thoroughly tested as most software products are. It is always a good idea to test code rigorously both from a functional point of view and from a security point of view, since code that does not fail gracefully can result in a device that chokes when exceptions or unhandled memory faults occur.

It is not yet a big priority to secure constrained networks. However as the adoption rate of these types of networks increase, so does the need for secure robust solutions for these types of networks. Many standards bodies are in debate over standardizing various security protocols which are geared towards low powered embedded devices, despite that, this area of research still shows activity.

Chapter 3

Design and Implementation

In this chapter, the way in which the research was designed and the way in which the software was implemented will be discussed. This chapter will cover both the high level concepts that will be discussed later on in this thesis and how they all fit together to form a Multi-Layered protection mechanism for wireless sensor network security.

3.1 Research Design

The research design will follow the set of questions set out in the next section. We will look at how we can address the issue of securing a constrained network and by doing so, formulate applicable research questions.

3.1.1 Research Questions

There are two main research questions related to the security of constrained networks that form the IoT environment that this thesis would like to address. The first question of which is related to how using layered security can be adapted to the computationally constrained devices of the Internet of the Things. Second question of which involves addressing the issue of how can these networks be managed autonomously with barely next to no human intervention. To answer these two questions we need to understand why these topics are worthwhile to answer.

Multi-Layered Security

Multi-layered security is the application of layered security in the Internet of the Things. As these devices become more ubiquitous and constrained, can these devices be robustly secured from an availability standpoint by using a suitable routing protocol? Even when the devices concerned range from highly powered computational devices such as laptops and smart phones all the way down to low powered micro controllers and low powered sensor nodes which need to use lightweight algorithms to account for their power and processing limitations?

Autonomous Network Management

Though the IoT is widely perceived as a distributed network environment, the m-to-1 (many to one) deployment model used by the multitude of USNs that form the IoT is a natural fit for a centralized network management model. Can a hybrid network management model benefit the network security in a USN? for instance some security features are moved from the distributed plane to a centralized plane to take advantage of the processing power of the gateway in order to compensate for the limitations of the lightweight sensor nodes. This is a valid question since for the most part the gateway is usually a very capable computer with copious amounts of processing power in order to service node data collection in comparison to the sensor nodes which reside in the USN that forms part of the IoT deployment. It could be worthwhile to see if moving all the network management and network security management from the sensor nodes to the gateway could result in a more secure and manageable network of ubiquitous sensor devices. However this has some repercussions in the way of single point of failure for security and other such issues.

Other Research Questions

- Can there be any improvements be made to the current stack of protocol options available to low powered networks in the context of a network of ubiquitous devices?
- Should there be any additional considerations to be added to traditional policy

frameworks when trying to formulate a security policy that considers a multi-layered network of ubiquitous (and low powered) devices?

- How would a hybrid network management benefit security and how can one strike a good balance between distributed and centralized security features?
- What do the improvements proposed above bring compared to current generation sensor networks that don't have the features above?
- Is it possible to make the level of security configurable at the very least before deployment?

3.2 Research Design Plan

In order to answer the research questions we need to look at how the network can be made more secure by using multiple security paradigms. Since quite often these types of networks use IEEE 802.15.4 we can already base our security around the security features and pitfalls of the IEEE 802.15.4 specification. IEEE 802.15.4 provides *confidentiality*, rudimentary *authentication* by access control lists, and *integrity* checking by CBC-MAC. For intruder detection we propose the use of a centralised security authority which monitors the network, this authority is usually the gateway/sink node since this node is usually a highly capable device in most Internet of the Things deployments. And for *availability* we propose a self-organising and self-repairing routing protocol that can react to adverse changes in the network.

3.2.1 Communications Protocol

In this regard, IEEE 802.15.4 is the specification that is the standard communications protocol that defines the physical and media access control layers for low-rate wireless personal area networks (LR-PANs). Since other more feature rich communications stacks in the world of wireless sensor networks are built on top of IEEE 802.15.4, most of the research done in this thesis will apply to those stacks, ZigBee and 6LoWPAN to name a few. IEEE 802.15.4 also offers encryption, integrity checking, and rudimentary access control for authentication.

3.2.2 Centralised Security

It is normally the case in sensor network deployments that the sink or gateway or root node is a highly capable node in the network. Capable of primary and secondary storage far superior to that of the sensing nodes, and it usually has a capable processor. A reasonable use case can be made for using the extra unused computational power for security purposes. In essence, centralised security involves using the extra processing power of the gateway node, to monitor the network and restore or blacklist nodes which are behaving abnormally or adversely to the networks goals itself.

3.2.3 Routing Protocol

A suitable lightweight routing protocol needs to be formulated and implemented. The routing of sensor readings in the IoT forms part of a major use case for sensor networks. The routing protocol should be offer robust recovery-from-failure mechanisms. The routing protocol should also be self-sustaining and self-organising, this will pave the way for painless network deployments and unattended deployment environments.

3.2.4 Layered Security




Figure 3.1: Layering of Security Functions

Layer 1, Application Security - Is the Application Security Layer, this layer deals with all logic that comes from the centralised security authority

Layer 2, Routing for Availability - Is the routing layer, this layer handles the partnering with neighbouring nodes and finding routes to the sink for sensed data, this layer provides availability.

Layer 3, MAC Layer - Is the layer that gives encryption, integrity checking and rudimentary authentication by access control lists (ACLs).

Figure 3.1 shows how the layering of security functions will be provided starting

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from the top. The application security layer (number 1) will be used to translate commands coming from the gateway into meaningful changes to the nodes' internal routing table. If a node has been deemed suspicious by the gateway then the gateway will broadcast the suspicious node to the network and then that suspicious node will be penalised. Chapter 6 will go into detail about how this is done and what sort of actions can be deemed suspicious by the gateway. This layer does not use any cryptographic methods per say rather it allows for the gateway to issue commands to the participating nodes in the network.

The routing layer (number 2) as seen in figure 3.1 will be responsible for network upkeep and network availability. Chapter 4 will go over how this is done. This layer is responsible for keeping the routing table up to date and also ensuring that nodes always have a suitable parent to route traffic via to get to the gateway.

The MAC security layer (number 3) as seen in figure 3.1 is the MAC layer as defined in IEEE 802.15.4 specification. It gives these constrained devices the ability to perform cryptographic functions. This layer will be responsible for hop-by-hop encryption, integrity checking and access control. This solution is an extension of previous work conducted by the author [9]

Chapter 4

Least Interference Beaconing Protocol

This chapter, as similarly previously published by the author [10], presents a frugal protocol for sensor readings dissemination in the Internet-of-Things (IoT). The protocol called Least Path Interference Beaconing (LIBP) is based on a lightweight path selection model that builds a routing spanning tree rooted at the sink node based on information disseminated through a periodic beaconing process. LIBP's frugality results from a routing process where the sensor nodes select the least path interfering parents on the routing spanning tree with the expectation of flow balancing the traffic routed from nodes to the sink of a sensor network. The simulation results produced by Cooja under the Contiki operating system are in agreement with previous results obtained under the TinyOS operating system. They reveal that LIBP outperforms different versions of the RPL protocol and the CTP protocol in terms of power consumption, scalability, throughput and recovery from failure as well as its frugality as a routing protocol.

4.1 Introduction

A new form of modern communication is emerging where sensing, identification and many other types of processing devices are combined with the objective of interacting pervasively with the physical world to provide to different users various services. It

is predicted that these devices will be deployed in our daily living environment in thousands of heterogeneous computing elements building multi-technology and multi-protocol platforms that provide access to the information not only "*any time*" and "*anywhere*", but also using "*anything*" in a first-mile of the Internet referred to as the "*Internet-of-the- Things*" (*IoT*) [11]. The next generation IoT infrastructure is expected to include millions of interconnected islands of sensing/identification networks spread around the world to provide services that would not be possible to provide with current generation sensor networks. Such network islands will be using multi-hop routing to avoid the need for the high communication power that might be required from the lightweight IoT devices for communication with each other directly. They will be operating on either an m-to-1 or an m-to-n routing model where where all the nodes will be collecting from their environments sensor readings carrying the information to be sent to either a unique sink node (m-to-1 mono-sink architecture) or multiple sinks (m-to-n multi-sink architecture).

4.1.1 Routing Over Constrained Devices

The routing of sensor readings in IoT settings can be formulated as a problem of finding a set of paths for routing the traffic flows carrying these readings from their points of collection to sink nodes which are tasked to deliver these readings to gateways for further processing. When applied to a mono-sink architecture, the traffic packets carrying the sensor readings are routed from nodes to neighbours along the path to the unique sink node following a multi-hop process usually aimed at reducing the energy that each node would spend if it had to send its data traffic directly to the sink. The process can be constrained by spatio-temporal and different other constraints depending on the IoT settings and the application. The solutions to the routing problem above may differ but are usually expected to be self-organized, self-repairing and frugal routing protocols in terms of storage, processing and communication requirements on the lightweight devices that are used in IoT deployments. In a typical mono-sink IoT deployment, the information carried by the sensor readings would typically be aggregated from the nodes towards a unique sink that forms the root node of a tree which is connected to the gateway by the sink with most of the

leaf nodes present in the network sending their sensor readings upwards towards the root/sink node for storage, analysis or further processing.

4.1.2 Contribution And Outline

The LIBP protocol [12,13] was previously implemented for TinyOS using the Tossim emulator [14]. This chapter presents a Contiki [15] implementation of LIBP and evaluates its performance compared to CTP [4] and different versions of the RPL protocol [5] with the objective of assessing the frugality of LIBP and its efficiency compared to these two other routing protocols. While the LIBP implementation presented in this chapter has been implemented from scratch following the model proposed in [12], the RPL [5] and CTP [4] implementations considered in this chapter are widely available in open-source format on a wide variety of platforms. They did not require any new implementation in the platform of choice for this chapter. The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 presents the proposed LIB protocol while 4.3 describes related routing protocols used in IoT settings. The results obtained through comparative simulation study are presented in Section 4.4, and finally Section 4.5 draws the conclusions.

4.2 Least Path Interference Beaconing Protocol (LIBP)

4.2.1 Protocol description

LIBP [12,13] is an implementation of the LIBA algorithm. This routing protocol, like CTP [4], uses a beaconing process initiated by the source (sink) node. When the process is initiated nodes incident to the sink node will be the first to recognize that a sink node is within one hop distance. This process is then initiated by these nodes to their neighbours and this process is repeated thereafter. This results in a network where each node is aware of its neighbours. The least interference paradigm is integrated into the process by which nodes select parent nodes which have the smallest number of (supporting) children, which is the parent of least traffic flow

interference. This configuration is especially powerful in the situation where sensors are periodically sensing information (which is a very popular sensor use case). LIBP basically aims to provide a way to balance traffic flow in such a way that it results in energy efficiency by having a network where nodes support less traffic. The network building process is highly detailed in the paper by Bagula et al [12].

4.2.2 LIBP Implementation

RPL and CTP are already implemented in ContikiOS [15], however LIBP is not, this resulted in having LIBP implemented for Contiki. Following the successful methodology of adapting CTP to conform to the LIBP model and ideas [12], this approach was used to preserve the same interfaces that CTP has implemented with the simulation environment (Cooja). At a very high level the link-estimate module for CTP found in Contikis network library was modified to conform to LIBP ideas. This means that the expected transmissions (ETX) link metric was altered to rather conform to interference represented by the amount of supporting children nodes. Features not required for LIBP were removed (trickle algorithm code for example). It should be noted that since LIBP in its Contiki implementation is forked from CTP's implementation in Contiki, it inherited the same underlying communications stack, Rime [16].

4.2.3 LIBP Network Building Process

The LIBP network building owes its power to simplicity that builds upon an ad hoc routing protocol that is also structurally similar to RPL in structure. LIBP uses two control plane messages for network configuration, one being the beacon message, and the other is the acknowledgement (ACK). In the scenario where the network is initialized, the root node will broadcast a beacon at a given interval where the beacon includes important routing information regarding the senders identity and weight. Once the root node advertises the beacon, nodes within the immediate vicinity of the root would have received the beacon. The root node advertises a weight of 0 which prompts the nodes within its vicinity to use that node as a parent. The parent

is alerted to the new nodes dependence by the acknowledgement packet. When a node sends an acknowledgement packet to a parent then that parent must increase its weight since that parent is supporting an extra node. See Appendix A for an illustrative protocol description of LIBP.

4.2.4 LIBP Maintenance and Recovery

From the network configuration stage of LIBP (shortly after network epoch) each node keeps a linked list of neighbouring nodes. This list holds an object which characterizes the neighbouring nodes address and its weight (interference) along with its route metric.

Maintenance - Since each node accounts for each of its neighbours in a linked list, it is then possible for nodes to perform rudimentary operations for local network maintenance, and in the event of parent failure, network repair is achievable. The age attribute is there to keep track how long that particular $LIBP_{Neighbour}$ has been in the list, whenever the $LIBP_{Neighbour}$ linked list is updated then the age attribute is incremented. The route metric attribute describes the precedence in which nodes are tiered by how far they appear to be from the root node, nodes with a low route metric are closer to the sink node. RPL uses a similar metric which can be described as node depth [5].

Recovery - When a node is compromised in such a way that its ability to communicate is impaired then recovery is required. Such a node would have to be removed from the network as a whole. This usually happens when a particular node is unable to acknowledge sent data messages, the main event which alludes to this conclusion is that a node would have retransmitted the same packet for an amount that is equal to the programmed maximum retransmits. If this happens then the compromised node is removed from the sending nodes $LIBP_{Neighbour}$ list. This in effect removes the parent of the sending node, which requires the sending node to pick a new parent.

4.3 Related Routing Protocols: RPL and CTP.

4.3.1 Collection Tree Protocol (CTP)

CTP [4] is a routing protocol which extends the Trickle algorithm [17]. It does so because the assumption can be made that data aggregation is one of the primary goals of a WSN. CTP promises to be reliable, efficient, robust, and hardware independent. CTP relies on data packets to validate the routing topology and loop detection. This routing protocol also utilizes adaptive beaconing (an application of Trickle) to dynamically setup and adapt to network changes. Every node implementing CTP maintains an estimate of the cost of its route to a collection point (namely, the sink node). This metric is typically called expected transmissions (ETX).

CTP Network Building Process

CTP (and RPL) employ a similar strategy for network construction. CTP extends the use of the trickle algorithm [17] by sending out control messages at a rate which is dependent on how dynamic the network is. In summary when the routing is empty (the network has just been deployed), A set number of nodes in a network advertise themselves as network roots. Thereafter, nodes form a set of routing trees to these roots. In CTP each node selects one parent as a next-hop link and that parent is closer to the root node than the node is.

CTP Maintenance and Recovery

CTP's strength lies in the fact that its network maintenance is implied by its adaptive control messaging implementation.

Maintenance - The adapted trickle algorithm used in CTP also counts for the handling of network inconsistencies. These inconsistencies include node addition, the significant change in link ETX and loop avoidance. The adapted trickle algorithm counts for the ability for CTP to maintain the network. Even if a network is heavily degraded, due to the adapted trickle algorithm, the network should relax to a near-optimum state.

Recovery - CTP employs a simple strategy for detecting node failure. In the case of node failure, all nodes which are dependent on the failed node will find another parent (usually the next best local parent). Node failure is usually recognized when a node cannot unicast a message to its parent, this is when the node uses up all its retransmissions for a given packet. Once node failure is established then a node will do a lookup in its routing table to find the best replacement if possible.

4.3.2 Routing Protocol for LLNs (RPL)

RPL [5] is a direct result of The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) which recognized the need to form a standardized IPv6-based routing solution for LLNs. The IETF formalized a working group specific for this problem called ROLL (Routing over Low power and Lossy). The direct outcome of this work group was RPL.

RPL Network Building Process

RPL is a Distance Vector IPv6 routing protocol for LLNs that specifies how to build a Destination Oriented Directed Acyclic Graph (DODAG) using an objective function and a set of metrics and constraints. RPL basically builds a logical communications graph over a physical network that conforms to satisfying a set of objectives and conforms to a set of constraints which can be set by a network administrator. The graph building process is initiated at the root (or sink) node, multiple roots can exist in the same network. The root(s) start advertising the information about the graph using messages outlined in its RFC and other literature [5].

RPL Objective Functions

An objective function (OF) allows for RPL to optimize, constrain, or scale the routing metric or link metric of a path. It is entirely possible to have multiple objective functions operating on the same node or same network. Objective functions allow network administrators to impose a set of rules which affect the traffic flow of the network. For example, on one subsection of a network one could implement a rule that specifies that paths with the best Expected Transmissions (ETX) must be used

and that the paths must be non-encrypted, or that paths with lowest latencies must be used while avoiding battery operated nodes.

Objective Function ETX - The ETX Objective function (OF-ETX) [4] is a widely popular link metric in the field of WSN. It is a link metric that in some way encompasses link congestion and link latency. ETX is simply defined as the expected number of transmissions required to successfully transmit and acknowledge a packet on a wireless link. In practical terms the $ETX_{root} = 0$ (the root node is not expected to send data packets) and the $ETX_{node} = ETX_{parent} + ETX_{linktoparent}$. The objective for OF-ETX is to (greedily) choose the route with the lowest ETX. It should be noted that OF-ETX is standardized and thus can be considered as a modular addition to RPL.

Objective Function Zero - The Objective function Zero (OF-0) is a relatively new objective function proposed by the IETF. In comparison to ETX, OF-0 is not highly established since ETX is considered a mature link metric in the field of WSNs. The goal of OF-0 is for a node to select a parent in such a way that it provides or contributes good enough connectivity to a specific set of nodes or to a larger routing infrastructure. OF-0 is described as being an OF which guides nodes in their parent selection using a metric called node rank. The rank computation of OF-0 has a set of constraints and norms which can be seen in its RFC [18].

RPL Maintenance and Recovery

RPL tries to limit the control plane traffic in the network to minimize the impact that control plane traffic has on the network. Some protocols use periodic keep alives (often called beacons) [12]. RPL uses a different paradigm when attempting to maintain and recover the network.

Maintenance - Instead of using a periodic keep alive for network node maintenance, RPL uses an adaptive timer mechanism called the trickle timer. This algorithm dictates the sending rate of control messages. In essence the trickle timer

treats the network as a distributed system that suffers from a consistency problem. A set of events confirms graph inconsistency, for example if a node detects a loop then the network is considered inconsistent, or when a node joins a network, or when a node leaves a network. The more inconsistencies that are detected the more control messages that are sent in the network. The more consistent the network is then the less control messages that are sent.

Recovery - RPL employs two techniques in order to recover the network from node and link failure. In essence RPL uses both local and global repair to initiate graph recovery. When a link or parent node failure is detected, the child node will quickly find an alternative route that conforms to the rules of the OF upon it. This is local repair, given enough local repairs, the graph may diverge from optimum setup. At this point it may be necessary for the graph to be rebuilt using global repair. Global repair is the rebuilding of the graph as if the network was newly deployed as outlined in the RPL Network Building Process section of this chapter. Thus global repair is costly as that imposes a high flow of control traffic in the network.

4.4 Performance Evaluation

In this section we will be testing the performance of the routing protocols, LIBP, RPL, and CTP respectively.

Testing Environment - These experiments will be conducted on the Contiki [15] platform. The mote that will be emulated in Cooja for this experiment will be the Tmote sky mote. In the case that emulation is not required; Cooja motes will be used for simulation. The experiment will be conducted in a simulation environment in which UDGM (Distance Loss) will be the radio medium of choice. RPL and CTP are already implemented in Contiki. LIBP was implemented by forking the CTP code found in Contiki and modifying it in order to meet the LIBP requirements.

Data Collection - Metrics in the experiment were collected by implementing the energest [19](Energy Estimation) module in Contiki, energest is used for ob-

taining per-component power consumption. This module gives metrics which are related to the amount of power required by certain modes of operation. The metrics that can be obtained from energest is the count of power utilized for radio RX and TX, Low Powered Mode(LPM), and Normal Powered Mode (NPM) also known as awake mode. By using the Tmote sky data sheet. The power utilized is described below.

To calculate the power we need an intermediary function which helps us calculate the power utilized.

$$f(x, y) = ((x \times 64) + (y \times 64)/1000) \quad (4.4.1)$$

And to calculate the power utilized given the energest RX TX LPM and NPM values we calculate the power.

$$P = 3 \times \frac{NPM \times f(1, 800) + LPM \times f(0, 545) + TX \times f(17, 700) + RX \times f(20, 0)}{64 \times (NPM + LPM) \div 1000} \quad (4.4.2)$$

Cooja also has an online data collection application called the shell collect view. The shell collect view gives a comprehensive breakdown of node specific status variables and meta-data. Cooja has another nice feature which comes in a Cooja application called Power Tracker. Power Tracker is an online real-time radio duty cycle monitoring tool. PowerTracker can be used to deduce the amount of time that a node spends in a particular state with regards to its radio.

Testing Variables - RPL will be run as two experiment instances since RPL can be run with various objective functions (OF). As a result RPL will be run with OF-0 and OF-ETX and thus for the rest of the chapter RPL will be referred to either RPL-0 or RPL-ETX to refer to RPL coupled with their objective functions respectively. RPL itself cannot be tested as a routing protocol rather RPL and an objective function needs to be tested against CTP and LIBP respectively. Since there are implementations for OF-0 and OF-ETX on Contiki already, the experiment variables will be the routing protocols, CTP, LIBP, RPL-0, and RPL-ETX.

Test Attributes	Test Value
Topology	175mx175m grid of 30 randomly placed nodes (density 30m ² /node)*
Beacon Interval	30 seconds (LIBP), Adaptive (CTP, RPL)
Messaging Interval	30 seconds
Message Contents	Hello from node
Simulation Runtime	10 minutes (2 minutes for network self organization)*
(LIBP)	1
TX/INT Range	50m/100m

Table 4.1: Simulation Setup

4.4.1 Methodology

Table 4.1 above outlines the experiment runtime. In short, unless otherwise specified, the networks are each given a 2 minute period to allow for the network to settle; thereafter the network is run for 8 minutes to give a total simulation runtime of 10 minutes. Each node will periodically send a packet containing the string "Hello from node" as its packet data. Since each node is given 8 minutes to send the data at a period of 30 seconds, the nodes will each send 16 packets data to be collected by the sink. For the various experiments, all of Coojas existing profiling tools were used as experimentation tools. Simulation timers and node real-time timers were used as experimentation tools for time sensitive experiments. For discerning between control plane traffic and data plane traffic the packets were flagged accordingly, the packets would then trigger a counter which would hold a value that shows how many times a packet of that particular classification occurred as traffic during simulation runtime. Routing protocols have to be tested in terms of scalability. 10 random topologies were generated ranging from a topology sizes of 10 to 100 (in increments of 10). Each topology had the same node density. The benefit of having all these network topologies is so that metrics related to the routing protocols can be observed while the topology size increases.

4.4.2 Results and Evaluation

In this section, CTP, and RPL (alongside its OFs) is evaluated against the new implementation of LIBP on Contiki.

Energy Profile




Figure 4.1: Average Power Consumption

The average power consumption, as shown in figure 4.1 was taken by averaging the power consumption amounts of each node. RPL seems to be significantly more power hungry on average when compared to CTP and LIBP. This could be put down to the fact that the radio in the sink node in RPL is always on, in addition to that, RPL is built on top of a slightly more capable but heavyweight communications protocol (6LoWPAN).




Figure 4.2: Radio Duty

Figure 4.2 shows the average radio duty cycle. It should be noted that the duty cycles represents the percentage of time that the radio was in a particular stage during the 10 minute simulation runtime. The TX and RX power draw are roughly the same on many notes.




Figure 4.3: Radio duty for the sink nodes

RPL makes the assumption that the sink nodes are typically well powered. This is shown in the graph above, the radios in the sink nodes for RPL are always turned on, which results in a very power hungry sink. The sink nodes in RPL would consume in the region of 60 mW, whereas the sink nodes in CTP and LIBP would consume power in the region of 4mW. In effect the sink nodes in RPL consume more than

1 order of magnitude more energy than the CTP and LIBP sink nodes. This can mostly be put down to the always on radio.




Figure 4.4: Scalability for the average power consumption

Routing Protocol	Mean (mW)	Standard Deviation (mW)
CTP	4.06	0.474
LIBP	3.24	0.278
RPL-0	5.01	10.81
RPL-ETX	5.43	10.73

Table 4.2: Power Distribution

The standard deviation of the power consumption for the routing protocol can describe how well distributed the energy consumption will be in the topology. This is a very important metric in figuring out the amount of time that a network can be deployed before requiring a battery change. Having a low energy usage mean and a low energy usage standard deviation shows that the protocol is energy efficient in its distribution and energy efficient in its implementation.

4.4.3 Routing Profile

The routing metrics of each routing protocol include the amount of supporting children per node, the average path length and the agility of the protocol.




Figure 4.5: Contention

Figure 4.5 above shows the average amount of children that a node would support. This value was obtained by counting the amount of times each node referenced a parent and then averaging those values. Having a smaller number of average children is a desirable metric because it can help with energy distribution in the network which helps with leaving all the nodes at more or less the same battery life. Having a high contention un-desirable since it may also introduce a higher rate of packet loss or interference into the network. LIBP being the protocol which tries to minimize the average amount of children in the pursuit for better energy distribution does better in this experiment.




Figure 4.6: Average Path Length

The average path length was obtained by obtaining the TTL like attributes in the protocol control plane packets. LIBP and RPL use TTL (time to live) however CTP uses time has lived (which is $TTL_{MAX} - TTL$). Once the number of hops was obtained they were averaged to give an average path length metric for each protocol respectively. Depending on the application, A high average path length is desirable for better for energy distribution but a lower average path length can result in a lower latency between the leaf nodes and sink nodes.




Figure 4.7: Time taken for node to recover from network failure

Figure 4.7 above shows how quickly the protocols can come up with contingency routes if a node with high contention fails. To simulate this event, a node with a

high degree of children (4 children) was chosen and deleted at the 10 minute mark. The times represented in the graph above shows the amount of time required for all 4 of the children to find alternate parents/routes. The data above shows how agile the routing protocols are in terms of how they deal with catastrophic failure.




Figure 4.8: Time taken for a new node to join the network

Figure 4.8 demonstrates how agile the protocols are in the ad hoc sense. The experiment was set up by running a normal collect experiment of 30 nodes, except 1 node would be out of reach from the network (thus not part of the network). At the 10 minute mark from the start of the simulation the secluded node would be introduced to the network. The times in the above graph represent the time it took for that node to have acknowledged a parent (to become part of the network).

4.4.4 Traffic Profile




Figure 4.9: Control Packets Sent

It is a worthwhile effort to see how much energy is spent on the control plane as opposed to the data plane. It should be noted that in the case of CTP, since beacon information piggybacks on data transmission, it counts as a beacon sent.

Protocol	Success Rate
CTP	99.7%
LIBP	99.7%
RPL-0	100%
RPL-ETX	100%

Table 4.3: Successful Transmission Rate

Table 4.3 describes the percentage of data packets that were collected by the sink node. Most packets were successfully collected by CTP and LIBP by achieving a higher than 99% transmission to the sink node. RPL achieved a 100% transmission rate. This astounding transmission rate could be attributed to how complete the communications protocol that RPL is built on top of is. Whereas CTP and LIBP are built on top of Rime [16].

4.5 Analysis, and Conclusion

This chapter presents a comparison between routing protocols. Experiments were conducted between CTP, LIBP and RPL. The simulations revealed that CTP and LIBP are relatively light in their implementation and goals but lack a few features that RPL has like mote to mote communication. RPL also can utilize the full stack of security mechanisms present in IPv6. The inherent heaviness of RPL can be attributed to its underlying protocol and how the underlying protocol uses larger more feature rich packets. CTP and LIBP are very similar in their performance metrics, this could be attributed to the fact that they both use the same underlying communications stack. CTP's strength lies in its very agile nature. CTP's trickle timer allows it to react to adverse changes in the network very quickly. One of LIBP's main goals was to have a routing protocol that was more efficient in its global energy consumption. This resulted in a protocol that is very efficient in how each node in the network consumes a similar amount of energy, and when compared to CTP and RPL, LIBP does a better job in this area.

Chapter 5

Communications Cryptography

As mentioned in the previous chapters, especially Chapter 2, having the option for confidentiality in communications is a well wanted function for a constrained network. In this chapter we evaluate and compare various methods of encryption and their mechanisms.

5.1 Introduction

The major challenge in these types of networks is that usually the nodes are short in computational power and storage capacity because they are simple devices with much less power requirements than most computational devices. Therefore doing complex encryption methods like frequency hopping and public key encryption is very difficult to set up, especially in a Low-powered and Lossy Network. However attacks on the network against confidentiality are still a great concern.

In this Chapter we discuss the various encryption mechanism available as specified in the IEEE 802.15.4 specification.

5.1.1 IEEE 802.15.4 Overview and Security

The IEEE 802.15.4 describes a wireless media access protocol for personal area networking devices. This protocol is widely used in the constrained network community as well. The 802.15.4 specification is designed to be implemented in hardware on

a radio controller [20]. The feature set of the 802.15.4 specification contains some security focused aspects, that can cater to a wealth of use cases.

The way that nodes are addressed in 802.15.4 is done by a 64-bit node identifier and a 16-bit network identifier. However the addressing mode is customizable to suit the needs of the deployment. The packet types which are relatively important especially in terms of security are the data packets and the acknowledgement packets. A data packets' length can vary in length and can be used for both unicast and broadcast messages. Each packet has a collection of flag fields that denote the packet type, mode of operation, security used, and whether the sending node is expecting an acknowledgement. A sequence number also exists in the packet and this is used to identify the packet and the sequence number is also used to guard against replay attacks. Most of the security in IEEE 802.15.4 is handled in the media access control layer (MAC). A constrained network can define its own type of security protection, There are 8 types of security settings that guarantee different security options as seen in table 5.1.




Figure 5.1: IEEE 802.15.4 Packet Description

Name	Description
Null	No Security
AES-CTR	Encryption only, CTR Mode
AES-CBC-MAC-128	128 bit MAC
AES-CBC-MAC-64	64 bit MAC
AES-CBC-MAC-32	32 bit MAC
AES-CCM-128	Encryption & 128 bit MAC
AES-CCM-64	Encryption & 64 bit MAC
AES-CCM-32	Encryption & 32 bit MAC

Table 5.1: 802.15.4 Security Modes

The link layer security in IEEE 802.15.4 provides four basic security interfaces all in the specification, access control, confidentiality, integrity and replay protection [20, 21]. The in-depth details of the security suites are as follows:

Null - No security materials or operations are used here, does not have any security guarantees. It is mandatory in all IEEE 802.15.4 radio chips [21].

AES-CTR - This mode of operation provides confidentiality using the AES block cipher with counter mode. The encryption of the plain text packet is done by breaking the packet into 16-byte blocks p_1, \dots, p_n and computes $c_i = p_i \oplus E_k(x_i)$. Each 16-byte block uses its own varying counter, which we call x_i . The recipient recovers the original plain text by computing $p_i = c_i \oplus E_k(x_i)$. The recipient requires the counter value x_i and this counter value is known as a nonce or IV. This nonce comes from the static flags field in the packet.

AES-CBC-MAC - This mode of operation provides integrity protection using CBC-MAC. The sender can compute a 4, 8, or 16 byte MAC using the CBC-MAC algorithm. The MAC uses a symmetric key to be computed.

AES-CCM - This mode uses the CCM methods for encryption and authentication. It first applies integrity protection over the header and data payload using CBC-MAC and then encrypts the payload and MAC using AES-CTR mode. As such AES-CCM is basically the combination of the AES-CTR and the AES-CBC-

MAC modes of operations.

5.1.2 Keying Modes

In symmetric cryptography, there are various modes of keying that nodes of the network must adhere to. The keying model used must be appropriate to a particular use case and must also be chosen based on what sort of resources an application developer is willing to pay for in terms of energy.

Network Shared Keying - Each node in the network possess the same key, and the same key is used throughout the network for each node to communicate with each other. Key management in this case is trivial since all communications use the same key. Also the memory footprint of this keying mode is most minimal [21].

The only problem with this keying mode is that this mode is vulnerable to insider attacks. also since a single key is used, it means that all nodes in the network could be compromised should the network key be discovered. Even though Network Shared Keying may seem quite vulnerable, it should only be used in non-critical use cases.

Pairwise Keying - Pairwise keying is when each node pair of nodes share a set of keys. Thus for every node, a particular node will have a key for all its neighbouring nodes at least. This has a lower risk of a network compromise if a node is hijacked since only one node will affected, only past and future messages to and from that node will be compromised. This provides better security than the Network Shared Mode since it does not compromise the network in its entirety [21].

Group Keying - Group Keying Mode is a mix between pairwise and network shared keying. A single key is shared among a set of nodes and is used to set up network groups between a set of nodes. The partition of nodes may be based on locale or network topology. The trade-off here is that if a key is compromised or

a node is hijacked that particular group is also compromised by an attacker node. However it still does not compromise the network in its entirety especially if the grouping was done correctly.

Hybrid Approaches - Some use cases may dictate a combination of the above 3 Keying Modes simultaneously. For example, we may have a sensor farm (or sensor island) which connects to a gateway via a hop-by-hop backbone network, one could argue that a group key for the sensor farm is a good option and that the backbone network should use pairwise keying.

5.1.3 CIA in IEEE 802.15.4

Confidentiality - Confidentiality sometimes implies the use of encryption to keep messages a secret from unauthorized third parties. When it comes to semantic security, which is preventing partial information from being observed. One example of a semantic security failure is if the same message encrypted twice yielded two of the same cipher texts. A technique for achieving semantic security is to use a nonce, a nonce is basically a uniquely generated identifier that can be piped into the plain text to produce a different cipher text each time. The main purpose of a nonce is to make sure that each invocation of encryption would yield a sufficiently different nonce. Typically nonces are sent in clear text and are included in the same packet with the encrypted data.

Authentication and Integrity - IEEE 802.15.4 allows for the use of Access Control via means of Access Control Lists (ACL). This all happens at the link layer which in turn safeguards the network against any parties who are not authorized to participate in the network. Trusted nodes have the ability to detect untrusted nodes by rejecting messages that come from entities that are not present in the ACL. If an adversary modifies a message from an authorized sender, it should also be detectable since the messages integrity is being attacked. The IEEE 802.15.4 allows for integrity checking or tampering checking by using Message Authentication

Codes (MAC) [21]. Each packet has with it a message authentication code attached to it and subsequently can be used to check the integrity of a message. A MAC is a cryptographic checksum for a string. Computing it requires parties to share a secret cryptographic key and this key is used in the MAC computation process. MACs have the property that they must be hard to forge without the key.

Replay Protection - IEEE 802.15.4 employs the same sort of replay attack protection that other similar networking standards use [20, 21]. An attacker who eavesdrops on a communications exchange between two authorized parties can then replay the messages again at a later time, this is known as a replay attack. Since the original message sent had a valid MAC the attacker can just re-send the same packet so that it looks like it came from the authorized originator, and the receiver will accept the message again. To get past replay attacks all packets are assigned a monotonically increasing sequence, and if a packet received has a sequence number that is less than one that has been already accepted then that packet is dropped.

5.1.4 IEEE 802.15.4 Drawbacks

Sastry and Wagner have identified several vulnerabilities in the IEEE 802.15.4 specification and they fall into the categories: Key Management, Integrity Protection, and Initialisation Vector (IV) Issues. According to the literature, IEEE 802.15.4, if used incorrectly by developers, can provide less security than what one might expect [21].

Key Management

Group Keying Not Supported - Attempting to implement group keying in IEEE 802.15.4 is really cumbersome. As Sastry and Wagner pointed out, If nodes n_1, \dots, n_5 wished to communicate amongst each other using key k_1 , while nodes n_6, \dots, n_9 use k_2 . Because each ACL entry can only be associated to a single destination address, there is no good way to support this use case. One way around this is to create 5 ACL entries, one for each node, all mentioning the same key k_1 . This requires that

the radio be large enough to all these ACL entries [21]. However as will be discussed, is that the ACL Table could contain the same keys in multiple ACL entries which can lead to more security risks. It is a very bad idea to consider this use case in conjunction with IEEE 802.15.4. Another proposed workaround would be to create a single ACL entry for key k_1 . Before sending to node n_1 , the destination address associated with that ACL entry could be changed to mention n_1 . If the application wants to communicate with n_2 with the same key, it must then switch the destination address. In essence the destination address of that particular ACL entry must be modified every time the sender wants to send to a new destination within the group. This makes packet transmission cumbersome. The only problem with this is that the receiver also needs to do the same thing prior to receiving the packets. This is usually not possible unless the network has predictable networking patterns.

Network Shared Keying Incompatible with Replay Protection - When using a single wide network shared key, there is no way to protect against replay attacks. To use a network shared key model an application must use the default ACL entry, recall that when there is no matching ACL entry for a sender, then the default ACL entry will be used.

Now in the case that the network shared key is loaded into the default ACL and node s_1 sends 100 messages using replay counters 0..99. The recipient would like to perform replay protection however it must keep a high mark of what the largest replay counter it has seen. According the the IEEE 802.15.4 specification, the receiver updates the replay counter associated with the default ACL as each packet arrives. Now if a sender s_2 , sends a message with its replay counter starting at 0, the recipient will reject that packet, in essence the recipient will only be able to accept high sequence valued packets from its neighbouring nodes.

Pairwise Keying Inadequately Supported - The specification as it stands does not have strong support for pairwise keying. The specification allows for a 802.15.4 radio to have up to 255 ACL entries, however it does not specify a minimum amount. In essence OEMs could manufacture radios with support for only two

ACL entries, in a ubiquitous network of constrained devices this could result to the networks' ACL entry will be limited by the device with the smallest amount of ACL entries.

Integrity Protection

Unauthenticated Encryption Modes - As per Table 5.1, the AES-CTR mode uses counter mode without a MAC. The standard itself does not require that radio designers support the CTR mode. Only is it mandatory in AES-CCM-64. Sastry and Wagner stated that AES-CCM-64 is a mode that should never be used since unauthenticated encryption allows for a significant amount of security risk to creep into the protocol. In 802.11, IPSec, and SSH, Researchers [20, 21] have discovered that there are unauthenticated encryption vulnerabilities that are applicable to IEEE 802.15.4 as they are in IEEE 802.11.

What should also be noted is that application developers who are not well versed in cryptography may not realise that failure to do integrity checks can affect confidentiality as well. This can be done by an attacker can forge an unauthentic message often tricking another network entity into disclosing secret material. The severity of a problem like this depends on the use case however researchers [20, 21] stress the use of of encryption with a MAC, otherwise you impose a higher security risk of breaches. Thus AES-CTR should never be used in isolation.

DoS Attacks on AES-CTR - In an IEEE 802.15.4 network, consider the following situation. When an IEEE 802.15.4 network uses the AES-CTR mode of operation with replay protection enabled. A sender s and recipient r communicate with the AES-CTR mode with a key k . It should be noted that the recipient does keep a counter composed of the key and frame counter, which drops packets whose counter is smaller than the highest current counter value. Suppose an attacker sends a forged packet with the source address s , key k and counter $0xFF$ and frame counter $0xFFFFFFFF$. When the actual legitimate sender s tries to send any information to r then r will automatically drop the packet and all packets then on from s . Since the packet with the highest counter has been sent, all packets from s

will be detected as being replayed. The attack is trivial to set up which makes it a high risk attack.

Lack of Acknowledgement Packet Integrity Checking - As far as the specification goes, 802.15.4 specification does not mandate any confidentiality protection or integrity protection for acknowledgement packets. The request for an acknowledgement from a recipient is an optional action by setting a bit in the flags field. If the bit is set then by the standard the recipient has to return an acknowledgement packet that contains the received packets' sequence value.

This security flaw can be further exploited by adding targeted jamming to prevent the delivery of packets. The attacker can transmit a short burst of interference while the packet is being sent, causing the CRC of that particular packet to be invalid to the recipient. Then the attacker can forge a valid-looking acknowledgement packet, causing the sender to think that the packet has been sent and received well. This particular attack causes concern for the security of these packets. If acknowledgement packets form a critical part of your network for reliable transmissions then this attack carried out on the network could cause harm. Researchers [20, 21] claim at this point in time, acknowledgements should be used loosely and not relied upon in a critical fashion.

Acknowledgement packets should be developed on the application level, since 802.15.4 provides MAC and encryption for application level packets. This solution is certainly quite complex however it is the only safe option.

IV Issues

Same Key in Multiple ACL Entries - The IEEE 802.15.4 specification allows for up to 255 ACL entries which are used to store node keys and nonces. The ACL entry is chosen by checking which entry is associated with which address. The sender chooses an ACL entry based on what destination address is being used. A vulnerability within the specification exists where the sender will unwittingly use

reuse the nonce. In the case that AES-CCM-64 is used and the same key k is used for recipient r_1 and recipient r_2 and initialises the frame and key counters to both $0x0$. If the sender transmits message m_1 with data $0xAA00$ to r_1 and then a message m_2 with the data $0x00BB$ to r_2 , the sender will use the same nonce for both the frame counter and key counter $0x0$. This is due to the fact that each ACL entry in its own right has its own independent nonce state. Since AES-CCM uses CTR mode, an adversary can recover the XOR of the plain texts by computing the XOR of the two cipher texts, completely breaking the confidentiality property.

Loss of ACL State Due to Power Interruptions - IEEE 802.15.4 devices are normally going to be of the constrained type which rely on stored energy or solar power. When power failure occurs, if no context saving is done, then the device will recover from power failure with a clear ACL table. In some cases the nodes software could repopulate the ACL table with the desired keys, however the nonce state restoration is not all that clear. Researchers [20,21] suggest to store the nonce states into flash memory, however storing into flash memory is slow and expensive in terms of energy usage.

Low Powered Operation - Similarly to the previous problem surrounding power interruptions, is how to preserve the nonce state when the devices are duty cycling for power conservation reasons. The IEEE 802.15.4 specification does not specify what sort of practices should be taken when a device comes out of a low powered state (that resets the ACL table). Using the same solution as the one suggested in the power interruption scenario is expensive and costly in terms of energy usage.

5.2 Performance Evaluation

Testing Environment - The experiments conducted were done so on the Contiki platform. The mote emulated in this experiment will be the Tmote sky mote. The

simulation will be conducted in a simulation environment in which UDGM (Distance Loss) will be the radio medium of choice. IEEE 802.15.4 can be used in the three unlicensed frequency bands 868/902/2400 MHz, since this research was conducted in South Africa, the only viable option to run an evaluation on was the 2400MHz band.

Data Collection - Various methods were used to collect data in this evaluation. The energy related experiments used the energest module in Contiki, this module gives a per-module energy usage report for a particular node if set up correctly. The simulation environment for Contiki, called Cooja, will also be used to collect node and network-wide statistics. Unless otherwise specified, these tests were conducted in a span of 10 minutes and each data packet was 512 bytes in length.

5.2.1 Methodology

For the performance evaluation of IEEE 802.15.4 and it's security modes. We need only look at the throughput and performance as seen from the MAC-Layer. At the very least these experiments will give an upper bound to the practical possibilities of the protocol. The maximum throughput is calculated between only one sender and one receiver which are located close to one another (10 meters) So in this case, packet loss is minimised, and the sender always has packets queued in the buffer to send.

The maximum throughput (TP) is calculated similarly to how Latre do it.

$$TP_{max} = \frac{8 \bullet x}{delay(x)} \quad (5.2.1)$$

In this formula, x is the number of bytes that has been received from the network layer. Take note that for packets that require ACK packets this time is slightly increased as the total formula for delay can be expressed as:

$$delay(x) = T_{BO} + T_{frame} + T_{ACK} + T_{TA} + T_{CRY} \quad (5.2.2)$$

Where the variables are:

T_{BO} = Back off period in seconds

T_{frame} = Transmission time for a payload of x bytes long

T_{ACK} = Transmission time for an ACK

T_{TA} = Turn around time

T_{CRY} = Time required for encryption/decryption

And thus bandwidth efficiency will be:

$$\epsilon = \frac{TP}{TP_{tm}} \quad (5.2.3)$$

Where TP_{tmax} is the theoretical maximum throughput for IEEE 802.15.4. In 2.4 GHz networks, the theoretical maximum is 250kbps.

5.2.2 Results, and Evaluation

In the following section we will be going over what sort of throughput IEEE 802.15.4 MAC layer can produce and what are the energy costs associated with using the various IEEE 802.15.4 security modes.

Performance Profile

	Minimum Delay (ms)		Maximum Delay (ms)		Average Delay (ms)	
	ACK	No Ack	ACK	No Ack	ACK	No Ack
0	1.96	1.74	6.12	6.01	4.40	2.95
16	2.16	1.85	6.4	6.01	4.68	2.98
64	3.14	2.52	6.4	6.04	5.26	2.98

Table 5.2: Delay Performance of IEEE 802.15.4 MAC layer

	Maximum Bitrate (bps)		Maximum Efficiency (%)		Average Bitrate (bps)		Average Efficiency (%)	
	ACK	No Ack	ACK	No Ack	ACK	No Ack	ACK	No Ack
0	145480	163450	58.192	65.38	142456	160545	56.982	64.218
16	140111	149899	56.044	59.95	138545	147898	55.418	59.159
64	125554	135412	50.212	54.1648	123444	132145	49.3776	52.858

Table 5.3: Throughput Performance of the IEEE 802.15.4 MAC layer

Power Profile

The power profile looks at what the implications are for using these security suites from a power usage standpoint. To get these values, the energy usage during all MAC layer operations was captured and stored as data. All this data was aggregated together to get an average power usage value for the 10 minutes.




Figure 5.2: Power used by each security mode

Graph 5.2 shows how much power was used per security mode in the 10 minutes of running the experiment. Unsurprisingly AES-CCM-128 is the most power hungry at almost 0.26 mW of usage.




Figure 5.3: Cryptographic operations per minute

Graph 5.3 is the graph that represents how many operations per minute can be sustained in the MAC layer assuming a constantly full packet buffer that feeds the network stack. The non-security mode has the highest amount of completed operations per minute since it has less internal functions to consume.

Security Mode	Energy Cost (%)
No Security	0
AES-CTR	6.530
AES-CBC-MAC-128	9.261
AES-CBC-MAC-64	4.756
AES-CBC-MAC-32	3.609
AES-CCM-128	10.543
AES-CCM-64	8.535
AES-CCM-32	6.752

Table 5.4: Energy penalty per security mode

Only counting the operations that happen that support the MAC layer, table 5.4 shows what the bump in energy usage per security mode would be as a percentage the baseline used for these values is the No-Security mode which can be seen as the "headless" mode that is always required for wireless communications.

5.3 Analysis, and Conclusion

The main thing to note about these experiments is that for the maximum throughput and the minimum delay, they were both determined under ideal conditions, only one radio was sending at a time and only one radio was receiving at a time. If anything could be concluded by these experiments is that even though there is a higher theoretical upper bound for the maximum throughput and a theoretical lower bound for the minimum delay, these could be seen as the theoretical upper bounds - in the case for maximum throughput, and similarly the theoretical lower bound for minimum delay. We also showed that the security modes do not consume the same amount of energy across the board. With no security mode being the least power hungry and AES-CCM being the most power hungry.

Chapter 6

Centralized Security

There exists a list of common intrusion detection problems and routing problems in Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN), one of the items in the list would be the sink-hole attack because of its ease of implementation. In Wireless Sensor Networks, a sink-hole attack is an attack upon a network in which the intruder would make itself look attractive to all the neighbouring nodes in the network which in turn causes the neighbouring nodes of the attacker to choose the sink-hole intruder as its parent. In this chapter we outline a strategy that could be implemented in order to launch a sink-hole attack on a particular type of WSN. And finally, we demonstrate and implement a safeguard against this specific type of attack.

6.1 Introduction

With the ever increasing adoption rate of computational devices such as laptops, cell phones, radio frequency infra-red devices (RFID) and tables. Computing devices have become cheaper, smaller, and more ubiquitous. A Wireless Sensor Network consists of a large number of small low-powered sensing devices. The deployment of a WSN requires each individual node to be placed in a location of interest which would serve its sensing goal. Wireless Sensor Networks are normally deployed to operate without supervision or intervention. It then makes sense that the network deployed should be self-organizing, self-correcting, and self-repairing. And with the help of a centralised security process, it should also be self-protecting. This chapter

introduces ways in which one could launch a sink-hole attack on a link metric based routing protocol called LIBP [12], and this chapter introduces a way to counter a sink-hole attack [22] in a wireless sensor network.

6.2 Contribution

This chapter aims to show that a centralised security process can be built on top of an already implemented routing protocol in order to serve as a detection and protection mechanism against a security attack such as a sink-hole attack. The centralised security process is a process that runs on the root node of the network, this process is responsible for overseeing the network and can monitor the network for adverse activity. In the event of an un-desired attack, the centralised security process can notify the network that there is a dangerous node within the network.

6.3 Related Work

One of the first approaches on the detection of sink-hole attacks has been presented by Ngai et al [23]. Similar to the protection mechanism outlined in this chapter, Ngai et al sought to use the base station in the detection process [23]. In their solution the base station would send a request message to the network, in essence this request message would request traffic flow information for a particular group of nodes. The nodes would then relay the messages back to the base station with the particular required information. Ngai et al showed that an accurate and effective safeguard against can be achieved by using the base station [23] as the container for some form of central security process. Pirzada and McDonald presented a survey of all the security add-ons which exist for most of the popular ad-hoc WSNs [24] (Typically called MANETs Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks). They classified a few of the various popular types of attacks on a Wireless Sensor Networks and also briefly outlined each popular WSN routing protocol and each protocols inherent weakness [24]. Krontiris et al showed that with minimal effort, a node can masquerade as an ideal parent for neighbouring nodes [25], this is not ideal since launching an

attack is relatively simple. Krontiris et al instead of using a centralised detection and protection mechanism as highlighted in this chapter, they instead highlight the problems in using a link metric based routing protocol and motivated for a better way to design the routing protocol in order to secure a network of sensing devices [25]. There have been other notable attempts to tackle the situation which can be found in other literature [26–33].

6.4 Threat Model

Since the routing protocol which we are trying to secure, while can be used as an ad-hoc network, will not be used as an ad-hoc network in this threat model. We assume the presence of an attacker that can access (and subsequently penetrate) the network by hijacking the internal state of a sensor node. This type of node hijacking has been referred to as a node capture [34]. As a result of a node being compromised the node, to carry out a sink-hole attack, will then advertise a false weight. We will assume that only one such node can be attacked at a given time. The consideration of multiple nodes being compromised simultaneously falls out of the scope of this chapter as that is an attack using collusion. Similarly since Sybil attacks presents itself in a similar light we wont be considering them [35].

6.5 The Sinkhole Attack

The sink-hole attack is a particularly easy attack to implement [32, 36, 37] which makes it high risk [23, 30, 34] In essence a sink-hole attack prevents a base station or gateway from receiving sensing data from the network. The Sinkhole is a compromised node which advertises a false (but attractive) weight with respect to the link metric being used, in LIBP [12] this weight would be anything below the best-non base station weight. The sink-hole then attracts the traffic of many neighbouring nodes thus resulting in the base station either not receiving any information in some cases. As a result this captured node could end up getting its energy capacity depleted really quickly due to the massive amounts of radio transmission needed to

sustain such an attack. The captured node then essentially can take on the attacker role of interceptor or the man in the middle.




Figure 6.1: Illustration of a possible sink-hole

Figure 6.1 shows exactly how the end result of a sink-hole attack may look like. Node S being the sink-hole as it supports far to many children and it goes against the paradigm of the routing protocol. Node R being the root (or gateway or base station), which gives node S the ability to selectively forward packets or read packet information.

6.6 The Centralised Security Process (CSP)

It is normally the case in Wireless Sensor Network deployments that the sink or gateway or base station node is a highly capable node in the network capable of storage far superior to that of the sensing nodes in the network. In terms of computational power the gateway node typically has the same computational power as a smart phone or inexpensive laptop. A reasonable use case can be made for using the extra unused computational power for security purposes. The major difference between this CSP and the one proposed by Ngai et al [23] is that this Centralised Security Process does not rely on information gathering via request and response, rather the CSP here requires that nodes submit additional data that piggy backs on the packets being sent to the gateway. In practice this equates to barely any extra

work being done by the nodes and in this activity no data extra packets are being sent. This data is then consumed by the CSP to build a network model and it will also store this data in memory so that it can use this data to validate the model.

Node Attribute	Attribute Type
Node Address	IP Address
Parent Address	IP Address
Parent's Advertised Metric	Weight

Table 6.1: Data Required by the CSP

6.6.1 CSP Implementation

The Least Interference Beaconing Protocol was implemented by the authors of this thesis on the ContikiOS [38] platform. Since the Centralised Security Process has to run within the gateway node. The CSP basically runs as a separate process within the ContikiOS framework. The convenience of this is that this CSP can be disabled very easily since it is only a modular addition to the gateways operation. The CSP requires tree building methods and a queue in order to do breadth first search operations on the model.

6.6.2 CSP Network Model

The CSP Network Model is basically a direct mapping of the physical network topology. In effect the CSP Network Model takes on the form of an N-ary tree. Since each node, with its sensing data, submits networking meta data as well via piggy backing on data messages if every node submits the weight and ID (in the form of IP address) of its parent then the CSP can construct a complete tree of the network.




Figure 6.2: (a) in-memory model (b) live network topology

In figure 6.2 above, the in-memory model is the tree representation of the live network topology. Sometimes the model may not visually map onto the live topology, the tree as a set of edges and vertices is exactly the same as the live network topology. It is possible to build this model since from each node the CSP is given information about the node, its parent, and its parent's weight, which gives us two vertices with the directed edge and the edge's weight (in this thesis referred to as the link metric).

6.6.3 CSP Sinkhole Detection

Once the CSP has built up the network model it can do various checks on the network one of which is sink-hole detection. Recall that the gateway running the CSP has collected information regarding the network over a period of time thus the CSP has a relatively good model on the network and where the traffic should be flowing given that the network is a tree-like where the data flows upwards towards the sink. The CSP with its model can calculate the amount of children each parent is supporting by running a breadth first search on the CSP Network Model. The breadth first search will give you, for a given node in the model, what the link metric it should be reporting. The CSP then cross checks the calculated link metric against the link metric that was reported by one of its children. If a node has no link metric reported for it then that means that the particular node has to be a leaf node.

Data: N-ary tree populated with advertised node data

Data: List of advertised weights of each node

Result: Possible candidate of sink-hole

Push root of tree onto queue

Mark root as being visited

while *queue is not empty* **do**

 Pop top element off queue into p

 c = first child of p

 kids = 0

while *c has not been visited* **do**

 Push c into queue

 Mark c as being visited

 kids++

 c = next sibling of c

end

 Mark c with calculated variable kids

if *advertised weight of c is less than kids of c* **then**

 | c is a sink-hole

end

end

Figure 6.3: BFS Algorithm for Sinkhole Detection




Figure 6.4: Sinkhole Detection Visualised

6.6.4 CSP Sinkhole Reaction

In order to decrease false positives to sink-holes, the CSP will need to run a rudimentary consistency check of the model against the most recent network traffic meta-data collected. If the CSP recognises a sink-hole in the detection phase, then the CSP will immediately broadcast a security beacon holds the information about what sort of attack the beacon is classified for and what the ID of the offending node in the network is. For each node with the offending node in their neighbour list, the node will penalise the offending node thus removing the penalised node from being potentially selected as a future parent. The security beacon is a normal type of beacon except these packets are prioritised. In the case of LIBP which is built on top of the RIME [16] communications protocol, the security beacon is placed on the messaging queue with a high priority which prompts the underlying communications interface to broadcast the security beacon as soon as possible.

6.7 Testing and Experiment Methodology

Testing Environment - These experiments will be conducted on the Contiki platform. The mote that will be emulated in Cooja [39] for this experiment will be the Tmote sky mote. In the case that emulation is not required; Cooja motes will be used for simulation. The experiment will be conducted in Contikis simulation environment called Cooja.

Data Collection - Metrics in the experiment were collected by implementing the energest (energy estimation) module in Contiki [19]. Energest is used for obtaining a per-component or per-node power consumption value. Cooja also has an online data collection application called the shell collect view. The shell collect view gives a comprehensive breakdown of node specific status variables and meta-data.

Number of Nodes In Network	Variable between 50 and 140
Topology	300mx300m
Mote	Tmote Sky
Beacon Interval	30 seconds (LIBP)
Messaging Interval	30 seconds
Message Contents	Hello from node
Simulation Runtime	10 minutes
Location of Base Station	(0,0)
Location of Sinkhole	Varying depending on experiment
TX/INT Range	50m/100m

Table 6.2: Parameters for experiment

Testing Methodology - The table above outlines the experiment runtime. In short, unless otherwise specified, the networks are each given a 2 minute period to allow for the network to settle; thereafter the network is run for 8 minutes to give a total simulation runtime of 10 minutes. Each node will periodically send a packet containing the string Hello from node as its packet data. Since each node is given 8 minutes to send the data at a period of 30 seconds, the nodes will each send 16 packets data to be collected by the sink. For each experiment run, 4 marked nodes will be placed within the topology, as the simulation time progresses at the following times a node will behave as if it is a sink-hole 2,4,6,8 minute marks For the various experiments, all of Coojas existing profiling tools were used as experimentation tools. Simulation timers and node real-time timers were used as experimentation tools for time sensitive experiments.

6.8 Results and Evaluation

The impact of the CSP implementation will be observed against a non-CSP implementation in terms of energy. The CSP will also be assessed in terms of how fast it is at detecting and reacting to a sink-hole. The CSP will also be assessed on

how long it takes for a sink-hole to be excluded from the network from the time the sink-hole had network presence.

6.8.1 Accuracy of Sinkhole Detection




Figure 6.5: The topology size vs success rate

Figure 6.5 shows the success rate of the CSP per topology size. The success rate is 100% for topologies of reasonable sizes however the accuracy drops off towards the copiously large topologies of 120 nodes and larger. The reasons for this could be due to noise, congested nodes, or dropped packets.




Figure 6.6: The topology size vs false-positive rate

The false-positive rate of the CSP is defined as how many times the CSP marks a node as being a likely candidate for being a sink-hole even though that node is not a sink-hole. In tune with the success rate of the CSP, the false-positive rate starts to increase for the larger topologies. The results can be seen in figure 6.6




Figure 6.7: The topology size vs false negative rate

In figure 6.7, the false negative rate is the rate at which the CSP has failed to correctly deduce that a node is a sink-hole. In effect marking it as a non-dangerous

node. This graph like the formers, increases as the topology sizes grow although a few more nodes were tagged incorrectly as sink-holes in the larger topologies.




Figure 6.8: The topology size vs packet drop rate

A possible explanation of figure 6.8 the unstable nature of the CSP could be due to multiple factors based on conjecture at this point. But by preliminary analysis it could be that it's due to large inconsistencies between the network model and the live network topology. The more nodes introduced into the network the more chances there are for packet drops, node congestion and carrier interruptions from radio interference. The drop rate of all sent packets increased as the topologies size went above 90 nodes.

6.8.2 Speed of Sinkhole Detection and Reaction




Figure 6.9: Node height vs detection speed

The speed of the sink-hole detection is the time it took from sink-hole activity for the CSP to recognise that the network had a CSP. In a hop by hop network like many in the domain of wireless sensor networking, the node height or rank can affect the time. Nodes closer to the gateway have less intermediaries than nodes which are far away from the gateway.




Figure 6.10: Node height vs reaction speed

The CSP reaction speed of the gateway per node height is the time it takes for the gateway to send out the security beacons to the affected areas. This graph in a way shows the reverse of the CSP Detection speed graph, the only major difference is, since these security beacons are prioritised, they travel much quicker than normal data packets.




Figure 6.11: Node height vs problem resolution speed

The CSP speed of problem resolution is the time it takes for a sink-hole from it being present in the network until the sink-hole is excluded in the sink-holes local network by penalty from the security beacons.

6.8.3 Overhead Cost of The CSP

The overhead cost of the CSP were obtained by running a host of Tmote Sky mote in an emulation environment which gives can serve up estimates on energy usage.

CSP	Non-CSP
3.901	3.866

Table 6.3: Average Power Consumption (mW)

This is the average power consumption for the nodes in topology size 50.

CSP	Non-CSP
2.841	2.643

Table 6.4: Gateway Power Consumption (mW)

The power consumption of a gateway running CSP is marginally higher than that of a gateway not running the CSP. The only major addition the CSP adds is the requirement for memory for the network model and packet historical data.

CSP	Non-CSP
1.983	2.822

Table 6.5: Energy Usage of Sinkhole (mW)

In the case of no CSP being implemented. The sink-hole, due to many radio TX/RX operations can use up far more energy than usual. A sink-hole attack in the case of node capture could mean that not only does the attacker have access to WSN information, but the attacker can also deplete the captured node of its stored energy quicker since that node acting as a sink-hole will be inundated with communications from other nodes.

6.9 Analysis, and Conclusion

The CSP presents a novel and simple way of dealing with a very easy to launch network penetration attack like the sink-hole attack. This thesis chapter presented the CSP, a process which relies on distributed information to perform a security check over the network. The CSP has shown that a modular addition to a unsecured routing protocol can help make wireless sensor network deployments more secure. The experiments tested the accuracy of the CSP and its impact from an energy standpoint on the network, the CSP was also tested on its speed in detection and reaction. The CSP's weakness is that it suffers from not being able to perform accurately when the network is under major stress in terms of network traffic. These major stresses result in node congestion, which can result in dropped packets, and

there is the issue with carrier sense interference which can get worse the more dense your topology gets.

Chapter 7

Discussion

This thesis involved the development, implementation, and experimentation of the Least Interference Beaconing Protocol amongst other routing protocols, IEEE 802.15.4 MAC layer security, and the usage of a central security process. The combination of these three components is used to bolster up the general level of security of a constrained network deployment.

7.1 Threat Model

Eavesdropping - IEEE 802.15.4 provides full protection against eavesdropping as long as the pre-shared key is not compromised as is the case for all other systems that use cryptographic encryption. An eavesdropper without the security materials required to decrypt messages cannot reveal the plain text.

Man-In-The-Middle Attack - In IEEE 802.15.4, the use of access control lists (in any non-AES-CTR mode) implies the use of message authentication codes, each packet will have the integrity of a message appended to it which protects against Man-In-The-Middle (MIM) attacks.

Sinkhole Attacks - The presence of a sink-hole could be used as a data vacuum to aggregate data to a non-gateway node. A sink-hole can have monumental affects. The Centralised Security Process (CSP) aims to minimise the proliferation

of sink-holes in a network.

Pre-Shared Keys - The pre shared keys are stored within the local IEEE 802.15.4 memory. In theory if a node is captured, the pre-shared key can be obtained by aiming a pointer to the shared memory stack of the constrained device. If the pre-shared key has been compromised then there could be a situation where the constrained node could have collected previous messages and will then have the ability to decrypt all these messages.

7.2 System Configurability

The composition of using a link metric based routing protocol with encryption means that the routing control packets (control traffic) can be encrypted, along with the data communication packets (data traffic). The benefit of having a system like this is that there is a level of configurability in what packets should be encrypted depending on the deployment requirements.

Data Encryption	Control Encryption	Protection	Susceptibility	Application
No	No	Rudimentary intrusion detection	Highly susceptible to multiple security breaches	Hobby deployment
Yes	No	Data integrity, confidentiality ensures protection from eavesdropping	Susceptible to network attacks, e.g. wormhole attacks	Rural deployments where sensed data is medical or private
No	Yes	Network attacks	Eavesdropping	Backbone networks
Yes	Yes	Network attacks and eavesdropping	Least susceptible to the attacks	Critical industry deployments (e.g. medical or military industries)

Table 7.1: Data Required by the CSP

Table 7.1 shows that depending on the deployment application, one can configure

the deployment to use confidentiality on either the data traffic or on the control traffic or a combination of both. Each use case provides a level of security that suits a use case. In the case that neither control nor data traffic is being encrypted, then there is only rudimentary intrusion detection from virtue of the centralised security process and since that functionality is also configurable (by toggle) it could mean that if the CSP is off then the network is totally susceptible to the whole spectrum of security attacks that exist in constrained networks.

Following that use case is the configuration where the data plane traffic is encrypted but the control plane traffic is left unencrypted. In such a deployment the only guarantees that can be asserted are that eavesdroppers cannot readily sniff data packets from the nodes within the network, however eavesdroppers can still sniff network control plane traffic and infer statistics about the network based on the traffic control data. This configuration is susceptible to attacks on the topology of the network, breaks in the network can occur or wormhole attacks can be constructed since the network control traffic data for the routing protocol can be forged by an adversary. This configuration would suit applications where there is low risk of intruders in an unattended deployment, however, the deployment requires that the collected data is infarct sensitive to eavesdropping, one such example of this deployment is one dude in a rural location where the data collected is medical patient data.

In the third deployment use case the data plane traffic is left unencrypted where as the control traffic data is encrypted. This means that the network topology and routing protocol less susceptible to attacks that go for the routing packets. This is because that these packets can't be forged or faked by an advisory who's trying to deny service or break the networks' routing table.




Figure 7.1: Linking two WSN groups to a gateway via a backbone network

Since the data traffic is unencrypted it is open to eavesdropping and packet forgery, however if the packets are encrypted on the application level then this sort of deployment is very suitable for backbone networks where the nodes operating under this configuration are just forwarding packets from an island of sensors to a gateway node as seen in figure 7.1.

The fourth and final deployment configuration is the most secure configuration especially if coupled with the centralised security process.

7.3 Known Issues

Centralised Security Process with IEEE 802.15.4 - The use of the centralised security with IEEE 802.15.4 can be more detrimental if used without any form of control plane traffic encryption. The Centralised Security Process (CSP) delivers its control packets as mandated by its deployment configuration. If these packets are delivered unencrypted and un-identifiable, these packets can be forged or subjected to man-in-the-middle (MIM) attacks. A situation where an adversary node in the network can arise, where the adversary can orchestrate the network in

such the way that the control packets can be constructed and made to look like they came from the CSP node, this could result in a broken network or the penalising of nodes un-justifiably.

Maximum Hop Length From Gateway - The Least Interference Beaconing Protocol works by periodic beaconing as initiated by the gateway node at the start of the networks' deployment. IEEE 802.15.4 allows for TTL_{max} to be set within its packet structure, however in preliminary experimentation, it was discovered that the further the node is away from the CSP/LIBP gateway node the more inconsistencies in behaviour that may arise in the network. In LIBP, if a node is alive in a network but has yet to receive its initial beaconing control packet, it may be seen as a network intruder. This is because the ACL is constructed during this network settling period.

CSP Race Condition With LIBP - Because of the way that packets are sent within the framework of Contiki [15] and Rime [16]. A packet could be queued to be sent to an adversary sink-hole node even if the the sender node has been notified that its parent is a sink-hole and should be penalised in its $LIBP_{neighbour}$ list. However since the packet has been queued it will be sent automatically by the Contiki packet buffer management system. This could result in a few packets being sent to the sink-hole even after the fact that the node has been notified that the sink-hole is infact present.

7.4 Future Implementations

End-End encryption - An IPSec style end-end encryption is a desirable addition to this thesis implementation. Having uninterrupted protection of communications data transferring between two communicating parties, in a constrained network this being the sensor node and the gateway node. This would typically be achieved by encrypting the data on the application layer of the OSI model.

Protocol Versioning - At some level it would be beneficial to have protocol versioning for future versions to make sure that all nodes within the constrained network

can adhere to the same protocol version of LIBP or CSP.

Chapter 8

Conclusion

The over arching goal of this thesis was to evaluate the validity of a body of security methods and how they could be combined in a constrained network or environment of lightweight devices. We gave an overview of the security threats present in this environment, and outlined the separate modular security mechanisms that could be used in order to further secure these types of networks.

This thesis presented an evaluation of the validity of the Least Interference Beaconing Protocol (LIBP) versus other constrained network routing protocols, Routing Protocol for LLNs (RPL), and Collection Tree Protocol (CTP).

We also presented a comprehensive survey about what IEEE 802.15.4 had to offer for constrained networks, with both its faults and merits we discussed certain pitfalls that exist in the medium access control specification. We also showed its performance under ideal conditions which can serve as a baseline for future researchers to compare results with.

We then presented an intrusion detection system that hinges on the high computational power that gateways usually have. The intrusion detection system used a naive approach to trying to monitor the network to catch sink-hole attacks. In its implementation this intrusion detection system basically was a modular addition to the routing protocol developed in this thesis (LIBP).

As a first step towards securing the constrained environment, we implemented

a routing protocol called LIBP to address the issue of network availability since network downtime is a security issue. We did a comprehensive study showing the merits of LIBP versus the other routing protocols (CTP and RPL) by doing a wide performance evaluation of these protocols. After addressing network availability we realised that the next step would be to secure communications between nodes. While many lightweight application level encryption algorithms existed, we opted for AES which are (usually) implemented in hardware on the IEEE 802.15.4 compliant radio chips. Also for interoperability making this choice was for the best since many other network specifications are built on top of IEEE 802.15.4. We saw the flaws of 802.15.4 from a security standpoint and presented a few feasible workarounds however not desirable. Once communications encryption was complete, we moved onto adding a "real-time" intrusion detection system for sink hole attacks. We showed how accurate it was and how fast the intrusion detection system was to react to sink-holes in the network. We also showed that our intrusion detection worked best when packet loss was minimal.

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
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Appendix A

LIBP Protocol Description



August 25, 2014

Figure A.1: How LIBP works and how a node accepts a new parent




Figure A.2: How LIBP works and how a node rejects an old parent

Appendix B

Least Interference Beaconing API Documentation

Source code for LIBP can be found at <https://github.com/Lutando/libp>. These API docs can help you navigate through the code quicker.

When the word term link metric is used, this is also the same as the link weight or in the context of the Least Interference Beaconing Protocol this is the number of supporting children.

B.1 LIBP

This is the documentation that describes libp.c and libp.h

void libp_open()

Opens the broadcast and unicast connections for LIBP.

void libp_close()

Closes the broadcast and unicast connections for LIBP.

void libp_send()

Sends a data packet with sensor data or otherwise to be queued by the Contiki packetbuffer framework.

```
void libp_set_sink()
```

Used on only the sink node usually this node has an address of 0 or 1.

```
void libp_set_beacon_period()
```

Sets the beacon period (in milliseconds).

B.2 LIBP Link Metric

This is the documentation that describes libp-link-metric.c and libp-link-metric.h

```
void libp_link_metric_new()
```

Initialises a new link metric.

```
uint16_t libp_link_metric()
```

Computes the link metric for the given link.

B.3 LIBP Neighbour

This is the documentation that describes libp-neighbour.c and libp-neighbour.h

```
void libp_neighbour_init()
```

Allocates memory for the $LIBP_{neighbour}$ struct.

```
libp_neighbour_list_add()
```

Adds a new member to the $LIBP_{neighbour}$ list.

```
libp_neighbour_list_remove()
```

Removes a member from the $LIBP_{neighbour}$ list.

```
struct libp_neighbour *libp_neighbour_list_find()
```

Finds a specific member from the $LIBP_{neighbour}$ list.

struct libp_neighbour *libp_neighbour_list_best()

Finds the best $LIBP_{neighbour}$ for parent selection.

int libp_neighbour_list_num()

Returns the size of the $LIBP_{neighbour}$ list.

uint16_t libp_neighbour_link_metric()

Returns the link metric of a specific $LIBP_{neighbour}$.